

The item below was filed by the A. P. to accompany
it's coverage of Senator Goldwater's speech at the
Veterans of Foreign Wars national convention.

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CLEVELAND--NL GOLDWATER (A57CO) INSERT AFTER 7TH GRAF: GOLDWATER
X X X VIET NAM.

WALTER MATTHIAS, A CIA OFFICER, IN A JUNE REPORT ON VIET NAM
MADE PUBLIC YESTERDAY, SAID THERE ARE "SERIOUS DOUBTS THAT VICTORY
CAN BE WON" BUT THAT "A PROLONGED STALEMATE CAN BE ATTAINED" WITH
CONTINUED U. S. AID.

MATTHIAS ADDED THAT "THERE IS ALSO A CHANCE THAT POLITICAL
REVOLUTION WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND DEVELOPMENT UPON THE WORLD SCENE
COULD LEAD TO SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED UPON
NEUTRALIZATION."

THE ADMINISTRATION DEFENDED THE RIGHT OF A CIA OFFICER TO MAKE A
PESSIMISTIC REPORT BUT SAID A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON
NEUTRALIZATION DOES NOT REPRESENT U. S. POLICY. IT ORDERED AN
INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE HOW A CHICAGO NEWSPAPER OBTAINED THE SUB-
STANCE OF MATTHIAS' REPORT WHICH HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY CLASSIFIED AS
SECRET.

"STUDIES AND ANALYSES OF THIS KIND ARE FREQUENTLY WRITTEN WITHIN
THE GOVERNMENT," ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY, STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER
TOLD NEWSMEN. "SUCH A PAPER IS NOT, NOR DOES IT PURPORT TO BE A
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ANY OF THE SUBJECTS WHICH IT DISCUSSES."

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID THERE IS A NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS TO "CALL THE SHOTS AS THEY SEE THEM" OBJECTIVELY AND
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO PARTISAN POLITICS."

THE SENATOR X X 8TH GRAF (A57CO)

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AUGUST 26, 1964

Negotiated Viet Peace Likely Soon, Goldwater Hints in Speech to VFW

By Morton Mintz
Staff Reporter

CLEVELAND, Aug. 25 — Sen. Barry M. Goldwater said today that Americans should prepare "for an announcement in the very near future" of a negotiated peace in Viet-Nam.

Although he spoke in the context of an attack on the Johnson Administration, the Republican presidential nominee did not make clear whether he objected to a negotiated peace on principle or only on certain terms.

Using Laos as an example in a speech before the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mr. Goldwater said that a negotiated peace that could result in the loss of a country would need "a long, hard look."

He also said, "If it is a consent to neutralization, it is an open door for Communist infiltration."

The Arizonaan preceded all of this by saying that "since the 1961 decision to forego the instructor role" in South Viet-Nam, "we have been in war ... I can't come up with any other word for that exercise."

Mr. Goldwater's remarks were departures from his prepared text. Its only specific reference to Viet-Nam was in a sentence saying that the Southeast Asian country, "tormented by many domestic problems, is being slowly murdered by the Communist violence."

In another departure from his prepared speech, Mr. Goldwater said, "I must say that I see a lot of truth" in a contention that to win the war in Viet-Nam "is impossible."

A month ago Mr. Goldwater's running mate, Rep. William E. Miller (N.Y.), said on "Meet The Press" (NBC, WRC) that "We should either win or get out."

Mr. Goldwater referred to a report made in June but just made public, in which a CIA officer, Walter Matthias, expressed "serious doubts that victory can be won." Matthias also said that with continued American aid "a prolonged stalemate can be attained."

The Administration has said that a possible negotiated settlement based on neutral-

ization does not represent United States policy.

Much of Mr. Goldwater's prepared speech dealt with the sensitive problem of control of nuclear weapons.

The nominee, who charged that the Johnson Administration is "misled by strange and unrealistic notions of appeasement and disarmament," said:

"... a way must be developed to provide NATO with

its own stock of small, tactical nuclear battlefield weapons—what may truly be called, and ultimately will be called, conventional nuclear weapons.

"... NATO's effectiveness would be enhanced if a political solution for the control of these small conventional nuclear weapons could be worked out in NATO itself.

"And let me stress — the American people don't understand, they're not given an opportunity to understand—that these small conventional nuclear weapons are no more powerful than the firepower you have faced on the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package."

So far as is publicly known, the smallest nuclear weapon is the Davy Crockett, which a Goldwater aide said has an

explosive force about equal to 40 tons of TNT. World War II's biggest blockbuster weighed six tons, including TNT and the steel casing.

At present, the Army's largest tactical artillery weapon is the 8-inch howitzer, which fires a shell weighing 163 pounds, including the casing. Apparently, Mr. Goldwater was referring to the potential of a single small nuclear weapon in destroying targets requiring a barrage of shells loaded with TNT.

Wearing a green VFW over-seas cap before an audience that interrupted with bursts of applause about 40 times in 30 minutes, Mr. Goldwater said that he had become accustomed to seeing things like the Matthias report escalate from newspaper stories—in the Chicago Tribune, in this case—into "established fact."

In introducing Mr. Goldwater, the VFW's national commander, Joseph J. Lombardo, was twice interrupted by applause from about 7500 delegates in the Cleveland Public Auditorium.

Resolutions Ready

The delegates have before them one resolution for carrying on a "full-scale engagement" in Viet-Nam "in order that we may have an ultimate victory and the defeat of Communist forces," and another for the banishment of the United Nations from United States territory.

Present Policies Cited
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 25 --

Administration officials explained today that for several years the United States has provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with nuclear weapons.

The custody and control over these weapons, however, remains with the United States, with the President ultimately responsible for turning over the weapons to NATO allies for use in a war.

On this point, the policy of the Administration and the preceding Eisenhower Administration differs from that of Senator Barry Goldwater, who is suggesting that political control over the weapons should be vested in NATO.

Under the present policy, atomic weapons designated for use by NATO forces are stationed in most of the Allied countries. The principal exception is France, which has refused to permit the "NATO stockpiles" to be placed on her territory unless she has control over the use of the weapons.

In some cases, the weapons, all of tactical rather than strategic size, are in storage dumps guarded by American personnel. In other cases, the warheads are mounted on the allied planes or missiles that would deliver them in event of war.

Through physical custody of electronic means, however, the United States maintains custody and control over the weapons. Partly because of concern that effective custody was not being maintained over some weapons, especially those already mounted on the weapons delivery systems, the United States has taken steps in recent years to tighten its control over the weapons through electronic means.

Thus, atomic warheads in planes or missiles of NATO allies can not be activated until certain electronic signals have been transmitted by the American custodians. The custodians, in turn, cannot turn over control of the weapons for actual use until permission has been granted by the President through the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Ever since the secrecy provisions of the Atomic Energy Law were relaxed in 1958 to permit creation of the "NATO stockpile," the United States has been providing most of the allies on a bilateral basis with information about the size and use of the weapons, but not about their nuclear design. The purpose was to permit the allies to modify their planes and missiles to carry the weapons and to train their crews in their combat use.

The United States recently entered into a similar information exchange agreement with NATO, corresponding to those already in effect with individual allies. The objective is to improve the exchange of information with the NATO alliance for planning and use of the weapons.

Periodically there have been suggestions from some military officials and Defense and State Department officials that actual control of the weapons should be turned over to NATO. These suggestions, however, have always run into resistance at higher Administration levels, largely because of the objections of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy that such a step would promote a diffusion of nuclear powers.

The Administration has taken another step in this direction with its proposal to create a multilateral force of NATO surface ships equipped with atomic armed Polaris missiles supplied by the United States. One of the ticklish and still unresolved questions is whether control over the weapons would be turned over the NATO force, as seemed to be contemplated in the original proposal of the Kennedy Administration. Largely because of skepticism on this point within the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee, the proposal has had slow going within the Administration.

The Central Intelligence Agency comments on Vietnam, mentioned by Mr. Goldwater, were written last February and were only a small part of a 45-page report on world conditions, it was disclosed here.

The Republican candidate

suggested that the study might have been the forerunner of an Administration announcement soon of a "negotiated peace" in Vietnam, but it was learned that Willard Matthias had prepared his paper Feb. 19. Although the revised draft, which found its way to the newspapers, was dated June 9, it was understood on high authority that the revisions did not touch upon the Vietnam section but dealt with other matters.

The controversial sentence on Vietnam, which was said by the Administration to reflect only Mr. Matthias's views, reads as follows:

"There is also a chance that political evolution within the country [Vietnam] and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Administration officials contended that this wording was "very far" from being a recommendation for a negotiated peace.

Mr. Matthias's comments on Vietnam accounted for 17 type-written lines on Pages 36 and 37 of the document, and were a part of his review of specific Asian situations.

The paragraph following his remarks on Vietnam said that "larger stakes" were involved in the Indonesian - Malaysian confrontation because President Sukarno feared that Malaysia might emerge as a power threatening the Indonesian sway in the region.

The main thrust of Mr. Matthias's paper was a discussion of the relative strategic power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the emergence of power centers in smaller states.

No policy recommendations were offered by Mr. Matthias on any subject he discussed in his study.

Goldwater Hits Foreign Policy

Nominee Expects Deal on Viet Nam

By HAYNES JOHNSON
Star Staff Writer

CLEVELAND, Aug. 25.—Senator Barry Goldwater, stating that the United States has been at war in South Viet Nam since 1961, today said "I think we ought to get prepared for an announcement of a negotiated peace" there.

He warned that if any negotiations resulted in a stalemate such as in Laos, Africa should take a "long hard look" at it.

"Since the decision in 1961 to forgo instructors' roles in South Viet Nam, we have been in war," he told a cheering veterans' convention. "We have been fired at and we have fired back and I can't come up with any word for that but war."

The Republican presidential nominee departed from his prepared text to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia.

After saying that "all people want peace" in South Viet Nam, he said the country must be prepared for a negotiated settlement.

"You ask me if I have a crystal ball, and I say no," the Arizona Senator told the annual Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at the Municipal Auditorium here.

He quoted from a Central Intelligence Agency situation paper made public Sunday as suggesting that the end of the war in Viet Nam appeared impossible. "I see a lot of truth in that," Senator Goldwater said.

His speech today was the sharpest attack since he began his effort to win the presidency a month ago.

He charged that United States leaders "are misled by strange and unrealistic notions of

appeasement and disarmament."

Applauded on A-Weapons

The Senator, who flew here this morning from New York, received the greatest applause when he strongly defended his position advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons for NATO countries.

"I am convinced," he said, "that the majority of great Americans who commanded NATO would agree that NATO's effectiveness would be enhanced if a political solution for the control of these small conventional nuclear weapons could be worked out in NATO itself."

Again departing from his text, he said: "Let me stress something that the American people don't understand because they have not been given the chance to understand—that these small conventional nuclear weapons are no more powerful than the firepower you have faced on the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package."

Hits Foreign Policy

In saying United States leaders were misled by what he called notions of appeasement, Senator Goldwater did not name any names. He said:

"Their eyes are turned away from the real world and are fixed in a hypnotic stare upon a

dream world. Their myopic world view is losing for us the flexible, mixed, tested and balanced force inherited from Dwight David Eisenhower. This was the true strategic deterrent."

The Republican presidential candidate specifically attacked the Johnson administration for what he called "abject failures" in foreign policy.

He said the administration had failed in two main areas—in keeping "our defense, high, flexible and mixed" and in providing adequate support for NATO.

A crowd waving banners and placards supporting President Johnson greeted him at Lakefront Airport here. Ohio Gov. James Rhodes met the Senator and Joseph J. Lombardo, national commander of the VFW, gave him an overseas cap to wear.

Senator Goldwater drove in a motorcade into downtown Cleveland. There were few crowds along the streets. In his speech at the Municipal Auditorium, he made two pledges with regard to NATO.

If he is elected President, he said, the NATO allies would be given an opportunity to "hook into our hot line" to Moscow,

"either directly or by diplomatic process." And, he pledged, there always would be a "meeting at freedom's summit" before any negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At one point, after strongly defending his position in support of providing conventional nuclear weapons for NATO countries, he asked the veterans:

"How would you feel if your sons had to stand face-to-face with a nuclear-armed Soviet horde and had no equivalent and modern weapons with which to defend themselves?"

Charges Disarray

The Senator said the administration, "by a lapse in leadership," had allowed the NATO alliance to "drift into a state of dangerous disarray."

"In all too many matters," he stated, "this administration has bypassed our NATO partners to deal directly and unilaterally with the Soviet Union."

"Who, our NATO partners might well ask, does this administration trust more: the leaders of the free world, the leaders of the Atlantic community—or the leaders of Communist despotism?"

He referred to "our hot line to Moscow as an unfortunate symbol of this" and added: "It suggests secret conversations,

involve all our partners in freedom."

Then he made his pledge to let our allies "hook into" the hot line.

"Only in this way," he explained, "will the Communist leaders know they are hearing over that line, not the single voice of a single leader, but the concerted voice of freedom's great Atlantic partnership."

Atom Weapon Issue

Turning to what he described as "the most sensitive problem of all"—the control of nuclear weapons — he repeated his viewpoint that "a way must be developed to provide NATO with its own stock of small, tactical, nuclear battlefield weapons." He defined these as "conventional nuclear weapons."

Senator Goldwater accused the administration of turning the question of control of the weapons into "a partisan political issue . . . for political advantage."

He replied to criticism that his views on bolstering NATO with those weapons were rash and irresponsible by saying:

"No. It is quite the other way. It is reckless to expose Europe to Communist forces equipped with those weapons and deny Europe an ample and immediately available force-in-kind. It is rash to face communism's legions in Europe with anything less than a fully credible deterrent . . . It is irresponsible to gamble the strength of the world's finest hope for peace in order to score a domestic political point."

Senator Goldwater repeated his suggestion that greater control over conventional nuclear weapons be vested in the NATO supreme commander, but said his mind "was not closed" on the subject. He made it clear, however, that control of large retaliatory weapons must remain exclusively in American control.

"These are the truly massive weapons which concern all mankind and rightfully concern every American," he said. "These weapons, I reaffirm, should remain in America's arsenal, under American control as established by the Congress."

AUG 25 1964

Goldwater

Address to VFW

Following is the text of a speech by Senator Goldwater before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cleveland, Ohio, today:

You are men who have known war. You are men who know the principal demand of peace. You know that peace, in a troubled world, can never be kept by the weak. Peace is the reward of strength.

You know that strength is more than the arms of a nation. It is the moral fibre of its people. It is their prayers, their dreams, their order of values, and their value of order.

Strength is not merely the mask of war turned toward an enemy. It is the face of faith turned toward the future.

Today we must measure our strength by a scale that goes beyond a single nation. We must consider the causes that draw nations together—or split them asunder.

There are two such causes in the world today; causes that over-arch the smaller differences between men and between systems; causes that in their depth of difference have torn the world almost exactly in two.

Tyranny, Freedom

One is the cause of freedom, the other, the cause of tyranny.

On the one hand is the array of nations and peoples who, though differing, insist upon the right to decide those differences in their own ways, in their own lands, by their own votes, by their own lights, and without impairing the freedom of others.

On the other hand is the bloc of nations whose leaders have come to power only through force and agree on these points:

—That communism is the wave of the future.

—That communism must conquer the world.

—That communism cannot be fulfilled until all other forms of society are destroyed.

This is the world as it exists. We wish it were not so. But to close our eyes to the Communist threat is to imperil our very civilization.

We see its ugly manifestations around the world.

The Congo is not embattled simply because of some purely local problem. It is bloodied by an assault Communist in origin, support, and purpose.

Cuba is not fomenting violence throughout the Latin Republics because of just another social doctrine but because of Communist doctrine and Communist zeal.

Viet Nam Story

Viet Nam, tortured by many domestic problems, is being slowly murdered by Communist violence.

Indonesia is a threat to the peace, because Communist support makes it so.

Laos is split by a Communist thrust.

Berlin is cleft by a Communist wall.

Wherever in the world today there is a serious threat to the peace, it is a Communist threat.

And wherever there is hope for peace, it is the hope of free world strength to deter communism;

to discourage communism; to develop all the pressures needed to make communism collapse by the weight of its own failures and internal contradictions.

Today, in its arms, this Nation has such strength. Today, in the heart of its people, it has such strength.

But its leaders lack this strength. They are misled by strange and unrealistic notions of appeasement and disarmament. Their eyes are turned away from the real world and are fixed in a hypnotic stare upon a dream world.

Their myopic world view is losing for us the flexible, mixed, tested, and balanced force inherited from Dwight David Eisenhower. This was the true strategic deterrent. This was the deterrent fashioned by such Secretaries of Defense as Tom Gates, Neil McElroy and Charles Wilson.

Shield of Peace

This mighty shield of peace is now being cast aside. We are asked, instead, to rely almost exclusively on a fragment of that shield—on retaliatory missiles whose dependability is yet to be proved, yet to be fully tested.

This failure—to keep our defense high, flexible, and mixed—this failure is matched by another. And it is to this other failure, a profoundly disturbing one, that I want chiefly to address my remarks this morning.

This administration, by its lapse in leadership, has neglected

the magnificent NATO alliance, and allowed it to drift into a state of dangerous disarray.

NATO has been and must be the shield of freedom. As it declines, so declines the strength of free men to deter war, so rises the incitement to aggression by communism, so declines the chance for peace.

This administration must answer not just to the voters of this Nation but to history for its abject failures in foreign policy. And of those failures, none is more tragic than the lack of support for NATO.

NATO should be a partnership of sovereign nations which, by sharing a common heritage and culture, can share in trust a common responsibility for the defense one of another, all of one.

Has this administration been a good partner, or even a working partner? It has not!

This administration has humiliated the Netherlands by supporting the demands of an Asian tyrant, in deciding the fate of Dutch New Guinea.

This administration dealt a blow to Great Britain and undermined its basic defense plans, by unilaterally withdrawing the Skybolt missile.

This administration refused to heed French alarms regarding the limited nuclear test ban—refuses still to lend a sympathetic ear to French aspirations for a secure European nuclear deterrent.

President's Hints

The President himself has offered gratuitous hints that Germans must learn to live

with the Soviet garrison that befriends their land.

In all too many matters this administration has refused to deal directly and unilaterally with the Soviet Union.

Who, our NATO partners might well ask, does this administration trust more: the leaders of the free world, the leaders of the Atlantic community—or the leaders of Communist despotism?

Our hot line to Moscow is an unfortunate symbol of this, regardless of its intended purposes. It suggests secret conversations, deals, unilateral negotiations in matters that concern and should involve all our partners in freedom.

I pledge that, as President, our NATO allies will be given the opportunity to hook into our hot line, either directly or by diplomatic process. Only in this way will the Communist leaders know they are hearing, over that line, not the single voice of a single leader, but the concerted voice of freedom's great Atlantic partnership.

Further, prior to any negotiations with the Soviet Union, particularly those at the so-called summit, I will propose that there always be a meeting at freedom's summit first.

I feel, further, that NATO's tremendous potential for applying peaceful economic and political pressures against communism has been ignored by this administration. It is true, of course, that there is much work ahead just to restore confidence in NATO and improve its consultative and control machinery at the political level. Beyond that, the economic power of this Alliance strikes me as vastly promising.

Wheat Deals Cited

Had NATO been what it ought to be, the recent fiasco of wheat deals would never have taken place.

The question of consultation and control within NATO is, of course, directly related to that most sensitive problem of all—the control of the weapons needed for NATO's and Europe's defense.

I have suggested, along with many responsible leaders who have considered the problem, that a way must be developed to provide NATO with its own stock of small, tactical, nuclear battlefield weapons—what may truly be called conventional nuclear weapons.

I am convinced, for instance, that the majority of the great Americans have commanded NATO would agree that NATO's effectiveness would be enhanced if a political solution for the control of these small conventional nuclear weapons could be

And let me stress that these small conventional nuclear weapons are no more powerful than the fire-power you have faced on the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package.

The present administration's attempt to make this question of control a partisan political issue, its attempt, for political advantage, to close the door tightly and arbitrarily on this

pressing problem, is just one more striking reason why NATO may be doomed to decline unless there is a change in American leadership.

This administration has attempted to scare not only our own citizens but those of Europe too, with preposterous alarms regarding these vitally needed NATO defense weapons.

But I refer again to the accumulated wisdom of men who have long worked with an in NATO. I cite the conclusion of a congressional task force that these "smaller tactical nuclear weapons have a strategic value of a magnitude which would indicate that they should be thought of in terms of conventional weaponry and not as weapons of retaliation for massive nuclear attack."

Conventional Arms

Let me repeat that vitally important key phrase—"they should be thought of in terms of conventional weaponry."

Rather than grasp this good common sense of modern technology, however, the present administration deliberately and cynically has made it appear that all suggestions to bolster NATO with these weapons are rash suggestions, reckless suggestions, and irresponsible suggestions.

No. It is quite the other way!

It is reckless to expose Europe to Communist forces equipped with these weapons and deny Europe an ample and immediately available force-in-kind.

It is rash to face communism's legions in Europe with anything less than a fully-credible deterrent at this practical tactical level.

It is irresponsible to gamble the strength of the world's finest hope for peace in order to score a domestic political point.

How would you feel if your sons had to stand face-to-face with a nuclear-armed Soviet horde and had no equivalent and modern weapons with which to defend themselves?

I have, because I have joined many NATO leaders in describing these weapons as conventional, suggested that greater control over them be vested in the NATO Supreme Commander himself.

made. My mind is not closed to any of them—so long as the objective is kept clearly in mind—to provide Europe with modern weapons most appropriate to their defense needs.

An American President, rather than slamming the door on the legitimate concerns of our European partners, should be opening new doors of consultation, new doors of exploration, new doors of cooperation and, above all, new doors of participation.

Weapons Control

Just as many responsible leaders have suggested some course along the line I have just mentioned, none—including myself—have suggested that the control of our large retaliatory weapons be turned over to anyone else. These are the truly massive weapons which concern all mankind, and rightfully concern every American.

These weapons, I reaffirm, should remain in America's arsenal, under American control as established by the Congress.

Our European partners already share a good deal of proper consultative responsibility in regard to the targeting and missions of these weapons. I would hope to see this participation and consultation grow, rather than diminish.

Even in this area, however, a foolish and dangerous move by this administration has introduced new doubts and opened the way for new NATO weakness rather than strength.

It has now become apparent that this administration has abandoned efforts to develop a mobile mid-range ballistic missile.

News of this latest set-back to American strength has been accorded only relatively minor attention in our press.

For many who are deeply concerned over the fate of Europe, this is news of the most grave and depressing significance.

Both General Norstad, as far back as 1959, and General Lemnitzer, now commanding

NATO, have stated that there is a genuine need in NATO for such a medium range missile.

The reason is apparent. There are more than 700 Soviet medium range missiles deployed against Europe.

Missiles Charge

These Soviet missiles have not only been ignored by this administration when publicly assessing the strategic strength of the Soviet Union, but now they apparently have been ignored in planning weapons for the defense of Europe.

Rather than provide the

this administration has offered a plan for missile-armed ships, cruising off the shores of Europe and manned by sailors of many nationalities.

The administration feels that this would solve the matter of controlling the missiles. Instead, of course, it would just introduce what some sensible commentators have called the threat of control by mutiny.

Instead of adding new security to a European deterrent force, it would create a string of sitting-duck targets.

As General Norstad has said, the difference in vulnerability between a land-based mobile missile, hidden or on the go, and a ship plodding along on the water's flat surface is simply the difference between locating a needle in a haystack and a needle on a billiard table.

Yet, this move has been taken by this administration in calculated disregard of the needs of NATO and the valiant millions who are our partners in it.

Future of NATO

The day is dark for NATO. The future need not be. All the hope, all the gloried promise of this foremost of the free world's alliances still can be revived, still can be realized.

But America must lead in the revival and join wholeheartedly in the realization.

America must not isolate itself from Europe, America must not build the walls of an illusory Fortress America. We must not shut ourselves off from the Atlantic civilization of which we are a part.

American leadership must dare to look forward to the flowering of this civilization, and not turn its dreams inward.

Above all, American leadership must open its eyes.

—To see the reality of existing threats to the peace.

—To see the reality of our need for NATO and NATO's need for us.

—To see the long road that we must take to a whole world, not just half a world, of peace and freedom and justice.

—To see that America's greatest days lie not behind us but ahead of us, in the building of the great civilization for which our common cultures have equipped us and our partners abroad.

This is the vision in which we can join. This is the vision in which I give you my pledge and ask your help and God's blessing.

AUG 25 1964

CIA Officer Sees Vietnam Stalemate

By the Associated Press

Washington

A CIA officer has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam and has suggested the eventual outcome might be a negotiated settlement. Administration sources said this is not the United States Government view.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against Communist guerrillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "trends in the World Situation."

Mr. Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong has stepped up its offensive and the counter guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

Continued large-scale United States support of the antiguerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," the CIA officer said.

Neutralization Urged

Mr. Matthias said there is also a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization." French President de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area; an idea coolly received by the United States Government.

Administration sources made the 50-page document available after learning it would be published in the Chicago Tribune.

Mr. Matthias wrote:

"The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever.

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction. The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Private Views

In releasing the paper, administration sources emphasized these views:

• Mr. Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the United States Government or of any agency within the United States Government. Members of the National Intelligence Estimates Board, a 12-man CIA committee and others have written numerous papers which are valuable for circulating ideas but do not represent policy.

• Mr. Matthias's memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials but was never given to the policy-getting National Security Council. It was submitted for publication to a magazine, which turned it down.

• The antiguerrilla campaign in South Vietnam may be long and arduous, but the United States Government is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there, and believes this will be done.

AUGUST 26, 1964

Barry Hints a Peace Deal Is Coming Soon in Viet Nam

Cleveland, Aug. 25 (UPI)—Republican Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater warned today that the country should get ready for "the announcement in the very near future" of a negotiated peace to end the fighting in South Viet Nam.



(NEWS photo by Ossie LeViness)

Sen. Barry Goldwater (left) dons VFW cap in Cleveland as he stands with Ohio Gov. James Rhodes, GOP worker A. L. DeMaiores and VFW National Commander Joseph J. Lombardo (l. to r.).

Goldwater departed from his prepared text to comment on South Viet Nam in a speech to about 8,000 delegates and guests attending the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Referring to a recently published paper prepared for the Central Intelligence Agency by Willard Matthias, Goldwater said the report found the war in South Viet Nam impossible to win and hinted of neutralizing that country.

Questions Neutrality Idea

He called for a "long, hard look" at any neutralization plan which he said could "open the door to Communist infiltration."

(Immediately after Matthias' report was leaked to the press,

the Administration said it did not reflect U.S. policy and was the opinion of only one man.) Most of the Arizona Senator's remarks were devoted to a plea for a stronger NATO alliance. He called again for arming NATO forces with tactical nuclear weapons and hooking NATO allies into the Moscow-Washington hot line teletype.

Goldwater was met by the state's GOP leaders and commented on the keynote speech by Sen. John O. Pastore (R.I.), at the Democratic National Convention Monday night.

Calls Problems Worse

Contrary to remarks heard in the past 24 hours, Goldwater said, the problems of 1960 re-

main in 1964, "only worse."

Goldwater flew here from New York and later left by plane for a six-day vacation at Balboa Beach, Calif.

"If we can get a little honesty out of the Secretary of Defense, he would say that Communist ballistic missile strength, intermediate and intercontinental—is greater than ours," Goldwater said.

The Senator's comments about Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara drew a round of applause.

A State of War

Since the United States abandoned its instructor role in South Viet Nam, "we have been at war," Goldwater said.

"All people want peace in South Viet Nam. There are peaces and peaces. I think we ought to get ourselves prepared in this country for an announcement in the very near future of a negotiated peace."

"Now there are negotiated peaces and negotiated peaces. 'If it's the kind of peace we

negotiated in Laos, that resulted in the loss of that country, then I think we should take a long, hard look at it.

Invitation to Reds?

"If it is consent to neutralization, it's an open door to Communist infiltration."

Goldwater, in his text, contended the NATO alliance has been allowed to drift into "dangerous disarray" under Administration leaders "who are misled by strange and unrealistic notions of appeasement and disarmament."

He said a way must be developed to provide small, tactical battlefield weapons for NATO—weapons which, he said, "may truly be called and ultimately will be called, conventional nuclear weapons."

He said the hot line is symbolic of the neglect of NATO allies by the U. S. because "it suggests secret conversations, deals, unilateral negotiations in matters that concern and should involve all our partners in freedom."

AUG 26 1964

Saigon Maze Sets New Tests for U.S.

By Robert R. Brunn

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Americans in war-torn South Vietnam are often seen as "those foreigners" who replaced the French.

The howling anti-American demonstrations of recent days have been no surprise to the United States officials who work hand in glove with the South Vietnamese regime.

It is not generally realized how intimate this cooperation has been.

For example, at the initiative of Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, a South Vietnamese National Security Council was set up patterned after President Johnson's agency that deals on a day-to-day basis with the foreign policy-military situation in various parts of the world.

New U.S. Weight

This council is being described already by some observers as a "joint command" for the antiguerrilla war. This term does not apply, however, in the sense that the whole strategy and tactics of the war are "joint."

But this almost day-to-day, formalized meeting of the top Americans and South Vietnamese certainly brings the "foreigners" weight to bear much more strongly into the government's decisions.

The council is described as "a committee of the whole."

Many observers feel that when this National Security Council is more widely publicized in Saigon and other cities it could well be picked up as a cause célèbre by the students and dissatisfied civilians who want more participation in the central government, and resent the close American collaboration.

Urgency Cited

But from the Americans' point of view this chance had to be taken.

An atmosphere of gloomy stalemate has pervaded the American command structure for weeks, and it is hoped this, almost daily continuing discussion of the war's problems in the council will help to educate the South Vietnamese Government in "how to win a war."

After talking in Saigon with responsible Americans and acute observers of the Khanh government and the war effort, the recent pessimistic appraisal of the Vietnam situation by an official of the Central Intelligence Agency is hardly shocking.

Such pessimism must often be discussed where major American decisions are being made, even if American officials

remain stoical about the fragile condition in South Vietnam and do not mention "defeat" or "negotiation."

But, after listening to its surprisingly frank analyses of its mountainous problems with the Khanh regime, the CIA conclusions by Willard Matthias about "a prolonged stalemate" and the possibility of "some kind of negotiated settlement" can, at least, be fully understood.

Every week finds more Americans arriving in Saigon—experts on psychological warfare, economics and finance (the banking system is antiquated and tottering), foreign relations, public administration and others.

Most seem to agree that more Americans are needed at the district and provincial level, too, and soon.

Someone has called this American presence the "shadow government."

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ROCHESTER, N. Y.
DEMOCRAT &
CHRONICLE

m. 132,711

S. 196,874

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

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Date: AUG 23 1964

Row Looms on CIA's 'Can't Win in Asia' Paper

Democrat and Chronicle Special Service

WASHINGTON — A ranking Central Intelligence Agency official believes there is "serious doubt" the Communist rebellion in South Viet Nam can be quelled and that a "prolonged stalemate" might be all the West can hope for.

This conclusion, reached in a scholarly paper called "Trends in the World Situation," promises to set off a political explosion because of Sen. Goldwater's determination to make the Vietnamese war a major campaign issue. The Republican presidential candidate accuses the administration of being timid in dealing with Communists.

Although the CIA was prepared to allow publication of the entire paper in a scholarly journal, the administration became concerned when it learned that one

newspaper—the Chicago Tribune—had acquired a copy. The newspaper was understood to be planning a story of the document today.

The State Department took the unusual step of attempting to reduce the impact of the story by making the article available to a small group of State Department reporters Friday night. At the same time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reportedly said that the document did not represent the administration's viewpoint.

Rusk was said to have emphasized that the paper was the work of one man only—the author of it, Willard Matthias—and that it had no official status.

The 45-page paper, dated June 9, 1964, touched on virtually every aspect of the Cold War. Its controversial section on

South Viet Nam consisted of just these few lines:

"The guerilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely on their own resources but under direction and control of the Communist regime in the North, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever. The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues, and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based on neutralization."

The paper will probably have international, as well as domestic, political repercussions.

If the Vietnamese came to believe there was predominant sentiment in Washington for a settlement through neutralization, the government's already uncertain grip on the country could be further weakened.

ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL

e. 254,622
S. 504,761

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 24 1964

Dangerous Document

THE PUBLICATION of a Central Intelligence Agency document which casts doubt on ultimate victory in South Viet Nam and raises the possibility of neutralization of that beleaguered land can only prove embarrassing in both domestic and international politics.

Why such a study was made public at a time such as this is indeed mysterious. In recent weeks we have stepped up our aid to South Viet Nam. The tempo of the conflict in Southeast Asia has increased. Reports of American casualties there have gone steadily up. Internal problems within South Viet Nam have multiplied.

A worse time for publication of such a report could hardly have been chosen.

We do not question the advisability of such a study. Certainly our intelligence people should examine every facet of our operations in Southeast Asia; and should attempt cold and objective evaluations of the chances of victory. But this is something that is not done publicly.

This is the type of material which should be considered in making policy decisions.

Although administration officials have quickly denied that the report represents United States policy, immeasurable harm can result from it. After all, the source of the study, the CIA, is an authoritative government department; a department which is noted for its cold and unemotional and non-political approach to national problems.

Domestically the study cannot help but enhance Sen. Goldwater's charge of a lack of the will to win within the Johnson administration.

Internationally the study cannot help but create doubts within the minds of our friends as to our stand in Southeast Asia.

Unquestionably, a great many people both here and abroad will wonder if this is a significant indication of a "peace at any price" approach which may be taken if the Johnson administration is retained in office.

Acceptable reassurance is going to be hard to come by. It is going to take more than a denial by "high administration officials" that the study represents United States policy. It will require at least a categorical statement to that effect from President Johnson himself, as well as determined actions to show that such a course is not being considered by this government.

**PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN**

e. 718,167
S. 702,577

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Page Page Page

Date: AUG 26 1964

Goldwater Takes Vacation; He'll 'Fish and Not Shave'

By ADRIAN I. LEE
Of The Bulletin Staff

Balboa, Calif., Aug. 26—Senator Barry M. Goldwater shook hands with well-wishers and patted a poodle on the head here before going to sea on a converted PT boat to "fish and not shave and have a good time."

For the first time, Goldwater seemed to accept the campaign chores he has shunned—hand-shaking, even poodle patting—as he deplaned at Orange County Airport yesterday afternoon for his last holiday before the opening of his campaign for the Presidency.

Leaving his blue and white chartered aircraft, he worked his way along the wire mesh fence along the runway shaking hands and smiling. His wife, Peggy, who had flown in earlier, met his plane.

Bars Politicking

Goldwater responded to questions on a possible political purpose to his trip by commenting: "No, this is a six-day vacation. I'm going out on the ocean and fish, and not shave, and have a good time."

However, on one question regarding President Johnson and Viet Nam, Goldwater said, "He's not being honest, the American public is not being told what is happening over here."

Within two hours of his arrival, Goldwater, his wife and two unidentified couples were at sea aboard the converted PT boat, Sundance, for a cruise.

Talks of Viet Nam Peace

The Republican nominee flew here from Cleveland, where he

told the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars—and the nation—to brace itself for a negotiated peace in South Viet Nam. Goldwater seemed to accept such a peace as perhaps inevitable but warned against neutralization which would leave South Viet Nam open to Communist infiltration.

Goldwater said that "I, along with many others," have to see a "lot of truth" in a Central Intelligence Agency officer's evaluation which suggested there was "a serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam.

The Johnson Administration has denied that the evaluation, by Willard Matthias, of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, represents Administration thinking or that a negotiated end to the conflict is planned. The evaluation was made public last Saturday by Administration sources.

Invites Newsmen

The Senator has invited newsmen aboard the Sundance today as she lies at anchor in Avalon Bay at Catalina Island, just off the California coast.

The number of acceptances threatens to swamp the boat. About 30 newsmen and photographers are expected to make the 35-mile trip from here to Catalina to board the boat.

The senator's invitation was in marked contrast with his refusal to talk to reporters the last time he boarded the boat for a cruise Aug. 1.

The Sundance is owned by Marvin E. Whiteman, a Beverly Hills realtor and longtime friend of Goldwater.

NEW YORK, N. Y.
POST

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S. 250,207

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Date:

AUG 27 1964

Goldwater Rhetoric and Vietnamese Realities

It was to be expected that Barry Goldwater would seize upon the CIA "think piece" about South Vietnam to charge the Johnson Administration with a "no-win" policy in that area.

But one would also have expected a candidate for the Presidency to have made at least some reference to the news from Saigon that filled the same day's papers, reporting massive discontent and opposition to President Khanh's rule.

The student-Buddhist threat to overthrow Khanh's U.S.-backed government underscored the basic U.S. dilemma in that region. If the people of Vietnam won't fight, how does one shape a strategy of victory?

It would have been helpful if Barry Goldwater had addressed himself to that question and made some concrete proposals.

Does he have a program for Vietnam?

AUGUST 26, 1964

AL-AKHBAR EDITORIAL CONSIDERS CIA REPORT

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0500 GMT 26 August 1964--C/L

(Excerpts) In its editorial today, AL-AKHBAR speaks of the recent CIA report regarding the use of force in today's world. AL-AKHBAR says: This report means that the era of threatening the use of force for solving disputes, has ended, and that the two major world powers--the United States and the USSR--can no longer use their conventional military forces in other parts of the world to solve disputes. This represents a great victory for peace. Failure of force to solve disputes makes it necessary to seek peaceful solutions. This consolidates the U.N. authority and gives more weight to its charter. We have before us an example which strengthens this conclusion, namely the Cyprus crisis. The use of arms has not led to a solution, and therefore the concerned parties have been compelled to search for other means which do not embody the use of force.

The reference in the CIA report to the increased strength of the UAR and Indonesia, and to their attempt to play a greater role in international affairs, also constitutes a gain for peace. These two states have no territorial ambitions. Because of their principles, ideals and the history of their development, these two states are regarded as advocates of peace and fraternity among nations.

In another article, AL-AKHBAR speaks of the Democratic Party platform and its reference to the Middle East. It says: the Democratic Party needs the votes of Jews. Therefore it will say anything which will insure these votes for it, regardless of whether such words are compatible or not with justice and right, or inconsistent with the truth.

AUGUST 31, 1964

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0300 31 AUG 64 L

(TEXT) ON THE EVE OF THE SAIGON EVENTS, A REPORT BY A SPECIALIST FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS PUBLISHED IN AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ON THE PROSPECTS OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ABOVE ALL IN THE WAR AGAINST PARTISANS. THE AUTHOR OF THE REPORT ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ONLY THING THAT THE U.S. COULD ATTAIN THERE IS A CONTINUOUS DEADLOCK--AND THIS IS ONLY A CASE THEY SUCCEED IN PREVENTING THE FURTHER WORSENING OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

IN THE LAST FEW DAYS IT HAS BECOME CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED IN PREVENTING THE FURTHER WORSENING OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THEREFORE, THE VICTORY OF THE PARTISANS AS WELL AS THE PRESERVATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS BECOMING AN UNATTAINABLE AIM FOR WASHINGTON. IF GENERAL KHANH, THE WASHINGTON STAR WROTE, CANNOT USE ALL THE NECESSARY FORCE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELS, THEN HE IS DOOMED, AND WE STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THE MILITARY EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PARTISANS ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE.

THE PLAN TO DRAW AMERICAN NATO ALLIES INTO THE SOUTH VIETNAM WAR WHOSE HELP WASHINGTON WAS COUNTING ON TO TURN THE TREND OF EVENTS, UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS IS EVEN LESS ATTAINABLE THAN BEFORE. WITH THE LOSS OF KHANH THE ALLIES WERE NOT VERY EAGER TO GET INVOLVED IN A DIRTY WAR. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESENT, HENRY CABOT LODGE, WHO IS NOW MAKING A TOUR OF THE WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS, WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE HIMSELF OF THIS. EVEN BONN. ON WHICH LODGE PUT GREAT HOPES, MADE IT UNDERSTOOD IN NO UNDERTAIN MANNER THAT THERE CAN ONLY BE TALK OF ECONOMIC AID TO THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, CERTAINLY NOT MILITARY AID.

AND NOW THE LAST CHANCES FOR SUPPORT OF ALLIES (FEW WORDS INDISTINCT), TO TAKE PART IN AN ADVENTURE WHICH THE INITIATORS THEMSELVES CONSIDER TO BE A FAILURE, AS THE NEW YORK TIMES STATES, THE U.S. OFFICIALS CONSIDER THAT SAIGON AND WASHINGTON MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE FAILURE OF MILITARY EFFORTS IN THE FAR FUTURE. IF THIS HAPPENS, THE NEWSPAPER WRITES, THEN THE U.S. WILL POSSIBLY BE FORCED TO REEVALUATE ITS POLICY IN THE WHOLE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

IN WHAT DIRECTION IS THIS CONTEMPLATED? THE RECIPE OF THE MADMEN IS THIS--SEND TO SOUTH VIETNAM LARGE U.S. TROOP UNITS AND TRANSFORM THEM INTO THE MAIN STRIKING FORCE IN THE ANTI PARTISAN WAR AS WELL AS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER IN SAIGON AND OTHER TOWNS; IN OTHER WORDS, AN OPEN AND UNCAMOUFLAGED COLONIAL WAR. THE SUCCESS OF SUCH A WAR IS LESS DOUBTFUL, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT WOULD AROUSE SUCH STORMY INDIGNATION IN THE ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT ALL POSITIONS OF WASHINGTON IN THESE CONTINENTS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. THEREFORE, FOR MANY SOBER THINKING AMERICAN POLITICIANS IT APPEARS TO BE INEVITABLE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY, NOT ONLY IN WORDS BUT IN DEEDS, TO BEGIN SEARCHING FOR WAYS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM PROBLEM AND TO END U.S. INTERFERENCE IN ITS AFFAIRS. WASHINGTON AT PRESENT IS DELAYING THIS DECISION BY STRIVING BY FALSE CONCESSIONS AND BY SHUFFLING THE PACK OF CORRUPT POLITICIANS TO GAIN TIME. BUT ONE THING IS CLEAR--THAT THE SAIGON SPIRAL OF THE AMERICAN POLICY HAS UNWOUND TO THE LAST LINK, AND WASHINGTON HAS NO GROUNDS WHATEVER TO HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PREVENT THE FINAL CRASH OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM ADVENTURE.

31 AUG 645A BB/GS

U.S. WEIGHING SAIGON SHIFT

Takes Exception To Goldwater's Peace Forecast

By PAUL W. WARD
(Washington Bureau of The Sun)
Washington, Aug. 27—The State Department reserved judgment here today on the value of the latest governmental shake-up in strife-ridden South Vietnam.

It also took exception to the prediction of an East-West peace settlement before November 3 for that part of Southeast Asia which Senator Goldwater, the Republican Presidential nominee, made to newsmen aboard his yacht off Newport Beach, Cal., yesterday.

The department spoke in both cases through Robert J. McCloskey, its acting chief press officer.

"No Information"

Asked this afternoon for an evaluation of an eight-hour-old report from Saigon, announcing formation there of a triumvirate of generals to rule South Vietnam for the next two months or more, McCloskey said he could offer no "substantive comments."

Stressing that press reports from Saigon are running far ahead of official dispatches from the United States Embassy, which Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor hears there, McCloskey added:

"We have no information that General (Nguyen) Khanh has ever relinquished the post of Premier.

"However," he continued, "we as yet have no analysis from the embassy as to the nature of the most recent action of the military Revolutionary Council (set up at Saigon last November when the Diem regime that had ruled there for ten years was overthrown)."

Asserting also that Washington had not been consulted in advance of the council's decision and that no Americans were present at its meetings, McCloskey added:

"We are satisfied, however, that the (62) members of the council have been diligently seeking a solution which they believe best to meet their difficulties, and we

hope, of course, that this will restore law and order."

When newsmen suggested the qualifying phrase "which they believe" might be construed as implying that "we think otherwise," McCloskey said he did not want to leave that or "any (other) implication." The department just does not have enough information to "make any analysis at this time," he stressed.

Goldwater Remarks

He was questioned next about remarks about the South Vietnam situation that Senator Goldwater has been making over the last two days.

McCloskey had responded with a "no comment" when asked yesterday about the Arizona Republican's admonition in a speech at Cleveland the previous day that the American electorate had better brace itself for a Johnson Administration announcement "in the near future" that it had made a "negotiated peace" in South Vietnam.

McCloskey showed no such compunction when questioned this afternoon about Senator Goldwater's elaboration of that theme yesterday. Asked if he had any reaction to the Republican nominee's assertion that the Johnson Administration is moving toward some sort of negotiated settlement, he asserted: "The United States Government is not engaged in any such negotiations as the Senator speaks of."

Under further questioning, McCloskey said it is "equally not so" that the Administration is moving toward or preparing for such negotiations.

Asked whether Senator Goldwater is getting intelligence briefings from Washington on the situation, he said he knew only that "opportunity for briefings in the executive branch has been extended to him in the past."

Serious Doubt

Newsmen who questioned Senator Goldwater yesterday reported that his views stemmed from a 45-page monograph entitled "Trends in the World Situation" prepared by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates.

In its section dealing with South Vietnam, the monograph said:

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary. There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile.

"If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Learning that a Midwest newspaper backing Senator Goldwater was about to feature such excerpts from the monograph in its Sunday editions, officials here made copies available to newsmen Friday night.

As additional counter-measures, they stressed that the monograph did not represent Government policy; that it set forth only the individual views of Willard Matthis, its author, and that it had never been submitted to the National Security Council or to the United States Intelligence Board, which prepares intelligence estimates for that White House council.

They also said the monograph had been written some six months ago and not only circulated thereafter in the lower echelons of several Federal agencies but offered for publication to a national magazine which rejected it.

Rusk Statements

It was emphasized that Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, repeatedly had spoken out in recent press conferences and television appearances against any such East-West negotiations over South Vietnam as Moscow, Peking and Hanoi have been demanding.

Noting also that Rusk had declared before the Democratic party's Platform Committee here on August 17 that "in Southeast Asia . . . we have made it plain that the aggressions of Hanoi and Peking will be defeated," they added assurances as of last Friday night that:

1. The Johnson Administration will not engage in any East-West negotiations looking toward the creation at Saigon of such a troika-type government for South Vietnam as was prescribed for Laos by a conference of fourteen nations, including the United States and Communist China, at Geneva in 1961-1962.

No Involvement

2. The Johnson Administration also will not involve the United States in any East-West negotiations as to whether North Vietnam's Communist regime and its Chinese Communist backers should keep their hands off South Vietnam and especially not in any recognition of a right on the Communists' part to attach conditions to compliance by them with their 1954 Geneva contract to let South Vietnam alone.

Senator Goldwater's prognosis in respect to South Vietnam — based, he said, on "what my political bones tell me" — included a prediction that there will be just such a "dishonorable settlement" as the one that was prescribed for Laos with the Kennedy Administration's assent and that the Johnson Administration is trying to maintain there.

Officials here said last Friday night that the Laotian and Vietnamese situations are entirely different and that they would not, therefore, entertain any proposal for putting South Vietnam under a troika-type government made up in equal parts of Communists, anti-Communists and neutralists.

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AUGUST 27, 1964

PRIS 72

REPORT ON S. VIETNAM

HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1855 27 AUG 64 Z

(TEXT) HANOI, 27 AUGUST--THERE HAS BEEN A HEATED DEBATE AMONG U.S. RULING CIRCLES OVER A REPORT BY A CIA OFFICIAL WHICH SAID "THERE REMAIN SERIOUS DOUBTS THAT VICTORY CAN BE WON" BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO WESTERN SOURCES, THIS 45-PAGE REPORT WAS WRITTEN BY WILLARD MAINTAS, A CIA EXPERT, AND FINISHED 9 JUNE.

THE REPORT, ENTITLED "TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION," IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE CIA. IT IS CONSIDERED A DRAFT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S LINE BUT WAS DISSEMINATED TO THE PRESS ON 25 AUGUST BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT BECAUSE OF THE RUMOR THAT THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHICH ALSO PUBLISHED THIS REPORT, WOULD SOON PUBLISH IT IN THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE.

ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM THE REPORT SAYS: "THE GUERRILLA WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS IN THE FIFTH YEAR AND APPEARS IN NO SIGN. THE VIET CONG IN THE NORTH, WHICH HAS VARIOUS PATRIOTIC FORCES--VNA) ARE PRESSING THE OFFENSIVE MORE VIGOROUSLY THAN EVER. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR HAVE BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, WHICH IS NOWLY MORE OF A POLITICAL CONTEST THAN A MILITARY OPERATION, AND LED TO THE REGIME'S DESTRUCTION. THE COUNTERGUERRILLA EFFORT (OF THE UNITED STATES--VNA) CONTINUES TO FLOUNDER, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM AND PARTLY BECAUSE BUCH'S SUCCESSORS HAVE NOT YET DEMONSTRATED THE LEADERSHIP AND INSPIRATION NECESSARY."

27 AUG 612P REB/RM

THE FOREIGN SCENE

Viet Nam:

Violence and a New Leader

Maj. Gen. Khanh on Tuesday gave up the presidency of South Viet Nam under pressure from rioting Buddhists and student groups. On Thursday, he and two other generals agreed to form a triumvirate, but yesterday, a civilian, Dr. Nguyen X. Oanh, a Khanh man, was made caretaker Premier.

The first small signs began appearing early last fall, shortly after the overthrow and murder of President Ngo Dinh Diem, the last popularly elected head of the government of South Viet Nam.

Last week, the handwriting was on the wall in letters so high that even those with half an eye could read it:

Barring a near-miracle or an unexpected cataclysm in Hanoi and Peking, the currently organized South Viet Nam-United States effort to defeat the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas is headed for defeat.

The United States has chosen a course which, in effect, places one foot in and the other foot out of the war in that Southeast Asian country. Despite heavily increased United States economic and arms aid—now at a rate of at least \$700 million a year—a boost in the number of American military “advisers” and more influence in decision-making, there have been three new national governments in Saigon since last November 1. Meanwhile, the enemy has grown bolder, stronger and more numerous.

Victory in Doubt

Obviously, no official in the Johnson administration is going to speak pessimistically in public—and perhaps they shouldn't, lest the morale in South Viet Nam dip even further. (There is a feeling in some quarters, however, that the American people have not always been given the full facts on the increasingly grim situation).

But, even before the latest

government upheaval in Saigon, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates concluded in a scholarly study entitled “Trends in the World Situation” that there “remains serious doubt that victory can be won (in South Viet Nam)” and that the situation there is “very fragile.”

The paper, written by Walter Matthias and dated June 9, 1964, was released by the State Department for last Sunday's newspapers when it was learned that the Chicago Tribune had obtained a copy of it. Other members of the CIA Board read the report and approved it in general terms.

Ousted President

Mr. Matthias suggested that a “prolonged stalemate” might be attained if large-scale United States aid continued and, ironically, “if further deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented.”

The “further deterioration”, unhappily, came last week.

On August 16, Premier Khanh, moving with the knowledge and, presumably, the approval of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, United States Ambassador, and the Johnson administration, ousted the popular figure-head President, Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the man who led the revolt against President Diem, and took the post himself. He also drew up a new constitution and assumed near-dictatorial powers.

Johnson Sent Message

President Johnson, who is not always cautious politically, sent the following message to Gen. Khanh:

“Please accept my congratulations and warm best wishes on your assumption of the office as President of the Republic of Viet Nam. I wish you every success in your task of consolidating the freedom and independence of the Republic of Viet Nam.”

The miscalculation on both sides

was enormous. Almost as soon as the fact of the seizure of greater power by Gen. Khanh was understood, Buddhist and student demonstrators took to the streets in protest.

Gen. Khanh, acting anything but like an “Asian strongman,” tried to conciliate the opposition groups. Failing in this, he allowed them to go on a rampage while his police and army did hardly more than look on. He was plainly seeking to avoid the use of repressive measures such as those which the ill-starred Mr. Diem employed in similar circumstances last year.

Clashes in Saigon

At the same time there were armed clashes between Buddhists and Catholics in Saigon and in the northern city of Danang. The Catholics are backing Gen. Khanh, a Buddhist, but the Buddhists assert that the general has kept Catholic elements of the Diem regime in the civil service and that they were discriminating against the Buddhists. Mr. Diem was a Catholic.

By Tuesday, it was evident that Gen. Khanh's tactic of letting the demonstrators blow off steam was not only not working but that the opposition was so strong that he would have to give ground. Consequently, the Military Revolutionary Council, the ruling group which Gen. Khanh headed, announced that it had repealed the August 16 constitution and would call a general assembly of the council to elect a new leader for the nation.

But the military group could not agree on a leader; instead it named Gen. Khanh, Gen. Minh and Lt. Gen. Tran Thiem Khiem, the former Defense Minister and a Roman Catholic, as a ruling triumvirate to serve until a national convention could elect a new President within 60 days.

There were reports from Saigon—denied in Washington—that Gen.

Khanh survived only because of United States insistence.

There were also reports that the Military Council had dissolved itself and that its members promised to return to their Army duties. But on Friday, Gen. Khanh surprised a news conference when he reported that the council had not accepted his resignation as President and that it was still functioning, seeking a political solution for the nation.

On Saturday, the "solution" was announced. Dr. Nguyen X. Oanh, finance minister under Gen. Khanh, was taking over as a caretaker Premier. Few Americans here had ever heard his name, but the Harvard-educated official apparently was hand picked by Washington for the job. At a news conference, Dr. Oanh said that Gen. Khanh was still Premier, but that he was "physically and mentally" ill and had gone to a mountain retreat to recuperate.

There were many guesses as to where the real power lay in Saigon, but it appeared that the United States was still putting its money on Gen. Khanh. When and whether he would recover from his "sickness" was the big question.

Gloom in Washington

Buddhist and Catholic leaders in Saigon, meanwhile, urged their co-religionists to halt their fratricidal strife. Their pleas had no immediate calming effect. It was widely believed that Communist agitators had infiltrated both groups and the student organizations and were doing their utmost to keep the violence raging.

On Friday, finally, the Army moved in to quell the bloody rioting in Saigon, which left at least nine dead and scores injured.

In Washington there was considerable gloom and a feeling akin to helplessness within the administration. Some officials expressed continued confidence in Gen. Khanh, but they could voice

only the hope that somehow the disorders would end and the country would unite for the war against the Viet Cong.

There definitely appears to be a power vacuum in Saigon today. The generals in the triumvirate have not seen eye-to-eye in the past. Perhaps the danger of the present situation will convince them they must unite for the good of their country. But even should they do this, the United States faces new and difficult decisions on its future role in South Viet Nam. The alternatives could very well be:

(1) The commitment of American combat units in an effort to "win" the war or to gain a position of strength from which honorable peace negotiations could be launched or (2) withdrawal of our forces, with the likelihood of the loss of all of Southeast Asia.

It is clear that the Johnson administration has rejected the second alternative and has no present intention of adopting the first one in the middle of a presidential campaign. But it is also clear that our current status has been leading us down a dead-end street. Therein lies the rub.

AUG 30 1964

Dark Outlook in Viet Nam

The JOHNSON administration took a long chance when it gave enthusiastic approval to GEN. NGUYEN KHANH's assumption of dictatorial power in South Viet Nam.

"I am always happy when something is done to strengthen the government's position against the Viet Cong," said MAXWELL TAYLOR, our ambassador to Saigon.

His predecessor, HENRY CABOT LODGE (commenting in Paris), said that "such changes make the government more effective . . . they are to be welcomed."

DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY CYRUS R. VANCE, also gave his blessing. He said that KHANH's seizure of power "should make for greater unity of effort in implementing the pacification program."

Yesterday these spokesmen for the administration had reason to wish they had kept silent.

As LBJ's faithful followers in Atlantic City applauded Key-note PASTORE's virulent attack on BARRY GOLDWATER's "irresponsible" foreign policy, violent anti-government demonstrations in South Viet Nam's four principal cities forced KHANH to resign as president, and revoke the charter of August 16 under which he assumed despotic powers.

This was a defeat not only for KHANH, but for United States policy.

The fact that the rioting, involving some 40,000 Vietnamese, occurred simultaneously in Saigon, Hue, Da Nang and Quinhon, indicates that the riots were not spontaneous, but planned by Viet Cong sym-

pathizers, and possibly timed to coincide with the opening of our Democratic National Convention.

The worst fighting occurred in Da Nang, which has become a U. S. air center since our reprisal bombings of North Viet Nam coastal bases, following P-T boat attacks on U. S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Barracks were stoned, but no American casualties have been reported.

As in our vacillating Congo policy, miscalculation has worsened our involvement in what is essentially a civil war of a divided people devoid of national consciousness. Now rumors are rife that GEN. DUONG VAN MINH ("Big Minh"), whom we hailed after the overthrow of DIEM as the strong man and savior of Vietnamese freedom, may re-enter the picture.

To add to the confusion, the administration may be considering a "negotiated settlement" in Viet Nam, as hypothetically proposed in a "study" written by WILLARD MATTHIAS, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates. He takes a pessimistic view of our chances of winning the anti-Communist war in Viet Nam.

This classified document was made available two days ago, but only after the administration had become aware that the Chicago Tribune had obtained a copy. A State Department spokesman promptly denied that MATTHIAS' paper represented a statement of the policy originally recommended by PRESIDENT deGAULLE of France.

Where do we go from here?

CIA Pessimism

Over Viets Not Policy

By STEWART HENSLEY
United Press International
WASHINGTON (UPI) —High administration officials said Saturday that a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document declaring that victory over the Communists in South Viet Nam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U. S. policy.

The 45-page paper was prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates to assess developments in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican presidential nominee Barry M. Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

Not Considered By Johnson

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's

National Security Council nor the top level U. S. Intelligence Estimate Board.

Aside from the Viet Nam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese-Russian ideological conflict.

The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now have the nuclear capability to destroy each other "has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe the use of other instruments of military power," the CIA paper says. "It has become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to project its military power in conventional form into other areas of the world or into disputes which may arise."

Leadership Lacking

The portion of the document on South Viet Nam which apparently touched a sensitive administrative nerve said:

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary. There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk have contended repeatedly that no compromise solution is possible until the Communists in South Viet Nam are beaten and Red China and North Viet Nam demonstrate they intend to "leave their neighbors alone."

CIA Vietnam Paper Branded Unofficial

State Department Spokesman Says Document
Has No Relation To U.S. Policies

By HOWARD NORTON

[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Aug. 24—A paper by a Republican-oriented American newspaper (the Chicago Tribune) last week, written by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of Estimates, was branded by the State Department today as having no relation to official policy.

Written by Willard Matthias, the paper expresses serious doubts about the possibility of defeating the Communist forces in Vietnam.

It states that it may become necessary to arrange "some kind of negotiated settlement, based upon neutralization."

Robert McCloskey, an official spokesman of the State Department, said studies of this kind are frequently written within the Government but indicated he could not explain how the document came to be published.

Not Policy Statement

"Such a paper is not, nor does it purport to be, a statement on policy on any of the subjects which it discusses," he said.

"I would strongly emphasize," he said, "that the paper was not cleared, discussed nor read by the United States Intelligence Board, by the Vietnam task force, nor by any principal officers of the Department of State or Defense."

The paper was first made public

by a Republican-oriented American newspaper (the Chicago Tribune) last week.

In comment on the CIA paper, the newspaper said it had been offered previously to a magazine for publication.

Political Effect A Factor

There were reports that Administration advisers were concerned over the possible political aspects of the paper, which appeared to support recent Republican charges that the Administration policy toward Vietnam was to regard it as a "no-win" war, after the character of the Korean War.

The State Department spokesman was asked to outline what the United States policy toward a negotiated settlement in Vietnam might be, since the CIA paper was to be branded as not a policy statement.

Reporters were referred to President Johnson's statement early this month at the time he asked for, and received, a strong congressional resolution of support for any military action he might regard as necessary in Southeast Asia.

The President's request—which was granted by Congress—was

for authority to take "all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty."

Mr. Johnson assured Congress that if given this authority he would, nevertheless, continue to explore any avenues of political solution that would effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The State Department spokesman warned newsmen specifically against relating this latter part of the President's statement to the CIA paper's comments on Vietnam which made no mention of guarantees against Communist subversion.

The same State Department spokesman declined to speculate on whether the new student riots in Vietnam were Communist-inspired.

BACKING OF KHANH AFFIRMED BY U.S.

Regime Called 'Best Means'
of Building Vietnam Unity

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24—The United States reaffirmed today its support for the South Vietnamese regime in the face of opposition to it by student and religious groups.

Commenting on anti-Government violence that has spread throughout the country in the last two days, a State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said, "Obviously, anything of a divisive nature is in the interest of neither the Vietnamese Government nor its people."

Although Mr. McCloskey insisted that the riots were an internal matter for the Vietnamese Government and that it was "too early" to discuss the demonstrators' motivations, other officials privately expressed concern.

The anti-Government unrest was viewed as another dangerous element in weakening the structure of the Saigon regime at a time when the Vietcong guerrillas are pressing their attacks with growing vigor and when pressurizes for a negotiated settlement of the war are rising in many quarters.

President Johnson met at 6 P.M. at the White House with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. It was not immediately known whether the Vietnam situation had been a topic of discussion. Mr. McNamara has just returned from a European vacation.

The main theme of the official comments was emphasis that the United States would take an extremely serious and negative view of any move to oust the regime of President Nguyen Khanh.

The officials cautioned against any analogies between the present charges of "dictatorship" being directed at President Khanh and the situation that prevailed a year ago when opposition was rising against the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

To make the United States' position clear, Mr. McCloskey read the following statement:

"The United States Government fully recognizes the need for national unity in South Vietnam and is, therefore, supporting the Khanh Government as the best means of building such unity at the same time that the war effort is being prosecuted."

There was no immediate evaluation here of the origins and precise motivations behind the riots. The inclination among officials was to ascribe them more to political than to religious problems, even though tensions between Buddhists and Roman Catholics have reappeared.

Mr. McCloskey said the situation was "not clear at this time" and therefore he could not say whether the riots might have been inspired by Vietcong agitators.

C.I.A. Study Discounted

Discussing a study suggesting a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, prepared by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates, Mr. McCloskey said: "Such a paper is not nor does it purport to be a statement on policy on any of the subjects which it discusses."

The 45-page study was written by Willard Matthias as a general policy discussion. It was made available Saturday after the administration had become aware that The Chicago Tribune had obtained a copy of the document.

Mr. Matthias's conclusions, which were described as representing his own views and not those of the C.I.A. as a whole and not of the Johnson administration, emphasized pessimism as to the chances of winning the anti-Communist war in Vietnam.

While the classified document had the "general approval" of the C.I.A.'s Board of National Estimates, according to a notation on its cover sheet, there had been no attempt within

the board to seek agreement on all the points.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

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AUG 23 1964

Date:

Dissident Voice Inside CIA Doubts Victory in Viet Nam

Washington, Aug. 22—(AP)—A CIA officer it was disclosed today, has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam and suggested that the outcome might be a negotiated settlement.

Administration sources said this is not the U. S. Government view.

The conclusion that no military end of the war against Red guerillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's 12-man Board of National Estimates.

In a paper on "Trends in the World Situation," Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong have stepped up their offensive, and the counter-guerilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

Continued large-scale U. S. support of the anti-guerilla campaign and an end of "further political deterioration within South Viet Nam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," he said.

Matthias said there also is a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

French President Charles de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area, an idea coolly received by the U. S. Government.

Administration sources made the document available after learning that it would be published in the Chicago Tribune. A magazine had turned it down. There was no explanation of

why Matthias was allowed to offer such a document for publication.

A cover sheet to Matthias' paper was released. Signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the National Estimates Board, it stated that the paper "has general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it."

Aside from the Viet Nam reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes in the world brought about by the nuclear stalemate between Russia and the United States and by the Chinese - Russian ideological conflict.

In releasing the paper, Administration sources emphasized these views:

—Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the U. S. Government or of any agency within the U. S. Government.

—Matthias' memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials, but was never given to the policy-setting National Security Council.

—The campaign in South Viet Nam may be long and arduous, but the U. S. Government is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there and believes this will be done.

—The Government also sees no grounds for negotiation with the Reds over South Viet Nam at this time. A negotiated settlement was reached long ago at Geneva and it is up to the Communists to stop violating the accord.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

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Front Edit Other
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AUG 23 1964

Dates:

Victory in S. Vietnam Doubted in CIA Paper Disavowed as Policy

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI). —High Administration officials said Saturday that a Central Intelligence Agency document declaring that victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U. S. policy.

The 45-page paper, prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates, attempts to assess development in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

APPROVED BY AGENCY

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various Government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican Presidential nominee Barry M. Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's National Security Council nor the top level U. S. Intelligence estimate board.

'ONE MAN'S OPINION'

Official sources disclosed existence of the document when they learned it had been offered for publication as a major outline of American policy. They asserted that this was not true and that the ideas were, as one official put it, "only one man's opinion."

Aside from the Vietnam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese-Soviet ideological conflict.

The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now

have the nuclear capability to destroy each other "has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe the use of other instruments of military power," the CIA paper says.

LIMITS OF POWER

"It has become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to project its military power in conventional form into other areas of the world or into disputes which may arise."

The paper adds:

With the big powers increasingly inhibited from "brandishing their strategic capabilities and projecting their conventional ones," the "secondary and minor powers" such as France, Egypt, and Indonesia, have taken the opportunity to strengthen their arsenals and try to play a greater role in international affairs.

Matthias wrote that "a nuclear capability in the hands of other than the two great powers is a nuisance and a potential troublemaker, but it is not much of a factor in the world balance of military power or indeed in the respect accorded to its possessors."

AUG 25 1964

IN WASHINGTON, U. S. BUOYS UP KHANH

By Laurence Barrett
Of The Herald Tribune Staff

WASHINGTON.

The State Department yesterday spoke out in defense of Gen. Nguyen Khanh's regime, whose already uncertain hold on South Viet Nam is being further threatened by Buddhist and student demonstrations.

"The United States government fully recognizes the need for national unity in South Viet Nam and is, therefore, supporting the Khanh government as the best means of building such unity at the same time that the war effort is being prosecuted," a State Department spokesman said. "Obviously anything of a divisive nature is neither in the interest of the Vietnamese government nor its people."

As a rule, the State Department avoids making official pronouncements about the internal affairs of other countries. That it chose to go

on the record yesterday was a mark both of Washington's deep involvement in Saigon's fate and of the concern felt here about the current civil disorders in South Viet Nam.

High officials keeping in close touch with events in South Viet Nam said privately that so far the demonstrations did not appear to be at the crisis stage.

There was some fear, however, that the troubles would follow the snowballing pattern of those just a year ago which resulted in the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November.

So far, it was understood, the American mission in Saigon has reported to Washington no evidence of Communist involvement in the riots.

Officials here ascribed the troubles to three factors: Continuing frustration over the seemingly endless war and its impairment of civil liberties; the fact that examinations have just concluded and it is

the normal time for students to let off steam; the anniversary this month of the Buddhist-government fight of a year ago.

One of the hopeful factors is that thus far, at least, the Khanh government has dealt rather gently with the demonstrators. The Diem regime attempted repression. This resulted only in new disorders.

Meanwhile, the State Department and others continued to deny that a report written by a Central Intelligence Agency officer and made public over the week end had any official status.

The report covered the entire Cold War front and touched only briefly on Viet Nam. However, it said that there was "serious doubt" victory could be won. That "Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary" and that possibly the war might end with "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Although the report was dated June 9, 1964, the Vietnamese section was written in February, just two or three weeks after President Khanh assumed power. Its apparent pertinence to the situation today, therefore, does not seem great.

However, some high American officials, both here and in Saigon, agree in varying degrees with the conclusion that complete victory over the Viet Cong seems unattainable. It would be most damaging for the Administration to admit this. Such an admission would be of psychological benefit to the Viet Cong. It would further weaken the

Khanh government. And it would play into the hands of Sen. Barry Goldwater, who is making a major campaign issue with the charge that the Administration is being too timid with the Communists in Southeast Asia.

The Administration made public the report, entitled "Trends in the World Situation," Friday night after learning that one newspaper had access to it. But officials stressed that the document was simply one man's opinion.

That man is Willard Matthias, a member of CIA's Board of National Estimates, which distills information from all American intelligence units and attempts to draw conclusions from this material for the benefit of the National Security Council, the State Department and the Defense Department.

Although the Administration was obviously unhappy about the timing and manner of the report's disclosure, CIA had cleared the paper for publication — presumably in full — in a scholarly journal.

U. S. 'Disowns' CIA Report on 'Neutral' Viet

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (UPI) — Administration officials are disturbed by the possible political repercussions of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Document which contains an implication that a compromise with the Communists may eventually be necessary in the South Viet Nam power struggle.

Top-level officials are attempting to make it clear that the CIA report—which declares at one point that victory over the Communists is doubtful and that a "Neutralization" deal may be called for—does not represent U.S. Policy.

45-PAGE PAPER

The 45-page paper, prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates, attempts to assess developments in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

It was written earlier this year. It has been circulated among various government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA Board, which had, however, made no attempt to reach complete agreement on every point of it.

The political implications of the report are obvious, inasmuch as Republican Presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater is charging the Johnson Administration with a "no-win" foreign policy.

Administration officials say they want to emphasize that the paper has never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's National Security Council or the top level U.S. intelligence estimate board.

Official sources disclosed the existence of the document over the weekend.

AUG 23 1964

U.S. Deplores Viet Riots, Official Says

BY WILLIAM ANDERSON

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

Washington, Aug. 24 — The state department today deplored the riots of South Vietnamese students against their government.

Department Spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said that while the motivations for the riots were not clear in the department, they were bad because they hampered the war against the Communists.

Of Divisive Nature

"Obviously, anything of a divisive nature is neither in the interest of the Viet Nam government or its people," McCloskey said.

He said that the United States "fully recognizes the need for national unity in South Viet Nam and therefore supports President [Nguyen] Khanh's government as the best means of building such unity at the same time as the war effort is being prosecuted."

The riots over the week-end, according to dispatches received here, have taken on both an anti-Khanh and anti-American tone.

No Yank Injuries

At Da Nang, for example, about 1,000 students attacked an American enlisted men's billet. Altho one native woman was killed, no American injuries were reported.

After anti-government riots in the capital of Saigon, pro-government youths counter-demonstrated at a youth center there.

McCloskey also had some comment on a report released by the state department after it learned it was going to be published by THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE in Sunday's editions.

The report, written by Willard Matthias of the board of

national estimates of the central intelligence agency, according to state department officials, drew a very dark picture of South Viet Nam.

Doubt of Victory

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won," the report said, and added that some "kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization" could be a solution.

McCloskey said that "studies and analyses of this kind are frequently written within the government. Such a paper is not nor does it purport to be a statement on policy on any of the subjects which discusses."

He said the document had never been discussed by the United States intelligence board, the Viet Nam task force nor any principal officers of the department of state or defense.

State Dept. Disowns CIA Neutrality Paper

Washington, Aug. 24 (UPI)—The State Department today disavowed a Central Intelligence Agency paper which expressed "serious doubt" that the Communists could be licked in Viet Nam and declared the United States might have to settle for a "negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Press officer Robert J. McCloskey said the CIA analysis, prepared by Willard Matthias of the agency's board of estimates, "is not, nor does it purport to be a statement of policy." Other officials said it had not been read or discussed by any top officials in the State or Defense Departments.

McCloskey said the President had assured Congress he was ready "to explore any avenues of political solution" if they would "effectively guarantee removal of Communist subversion"—guarantees which were not mentioned in the CIA paper.

WALL STREET

JOURNAL

Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900050006-2

AUG 25 1964

The State Department disavowed a Central Intelligence Agency report expressing "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam. The report said, "at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained." The State Department said the report wasn't a policy statement and reaffirmed U.S. support of Khanh.

AUGUST 24, 1964

FBIS 58

CIA VIETNAM REPORT

BELGRADE TANYUG INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1639 24 AUG 64 L

(TEXT) WASHINGTON--CONSIDERABLE CONCERN HAS BEEN PROVOKED HERE BY A REPORT WHICH IS UNOFFICIALLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE POOR PROSPECTS OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED AND COMMENTED UPON BY SOME AMERICAN PAPERS. THE DOCUMENT, WHICH IS DENIED AN OFFICIAL CHARACTER, CONCLUDES THAT THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT ABOUT TO END AND THAT SOME POLITICAL SOLUTION IS LIKELY ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRALIZING THE COUNTRY.

THE REPORT PROVOKED SURPRISE HERE, BUT SOME HIGH-PLACED MILITARY QUARTERS, ACCORDING TO THE NEW YORK TIMES, ADMIT THAT THIS POSSIBILITY HAS LONG SINCE BEEN DISCUSSED. SOME COMMENTATORS CONSIDER THAT THE DOCUMENT IS THE VIEW NOT ONLY OF THE AUTHOR BUT ALSO OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH HAS APPROVED IT.

24 AUG 523P BB/OP

AUGUST 24, 1964

FBIS 56

EAST BERLIN NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 24 AUG 64 G

(PRESS SCRUTINY)

(TEXT) IN A REPORT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANS, MEMBER OF THE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CIA WILLARD MATHIAS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT A VICTORY OVER THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIBERATION FRONT.

24 AUG 437P JB/OP

AUGUST 27, 1964

Behind the Headlines

U.S. Viet-Nam Reports Raise Queries

By ALBERT E. PRUDENCE
World News Editor

A couple of government reports on South Viet-Nam should make Americans shudder and raise a few sticky questions.

One of the reports — referring to neutralization of South Viet-Nam — could make French President Charles de Gaulle look pretty smug.



PRUDENCE

The reports are by the Central Intelligence Agency and the General Accounting Office, the watchdog over possible graft or waste of the taxpayer's money.

The CIA report is by Willard Matthias and is entitled "Trends in the World Situation."

HE WROTE in part:

"If large-scale U. S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet-Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

"There is also a chance that political evolution with the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

NEUTRALIZATION is the solution offered by France, which battled the Reds in Southeast Asia from Dec. 19, 1946, until it surrendered July 21, 1954. Cost of the Indochina war was put by France at five billion dollars and 100,000 dead or missing.

One big question is what is behind the CIA report? Is the U. S. spy agency trying to influence U. S. policy? Is it preparing the public for a negotiated settlement and eventual withdrawal of U. S. forces from Southeast Asia?

State Department Press Officer Robert McCloskey said that the report prepared for the CIA's Board of Estimates does not reflect U. S. policy.

ANOTHER big question is how the report became public? Usually anything about the CIA is secret.

One report is that the report was released because a newspaper had obtained a

copy. But if such had been "leaked" to a reporter what else may have been "leaked" to Red spies? In short, has the CIA been penetrated by the opposition?

At least, the Reds in Southeast Asia now know that possibly the U. S. could be interested in negotiations and a neutralized South Viet-Nam. As the poet Thomas Campbell wrote more than 100 years ago, "Coming events cast their shadows before."

THE REPORT on use of U. S. funds in Viet-Nam covers the period 1958-1962 and questions whether some funds have been used wisely. Keep in mind, that the U. S. from 1955 through 1962 gave \$1,500,000,000 in aid to South Viet-Nam and that current aid amounts to more than \$1,500,000 a day.

Some of the funds, of course, go into commercial enterprises through private

businesses.

LOOK what happened to kerosene, whisky and perfume, according to the GAO report.

Kerosene, which most low-income groups use for lighting and cooking, was taxed by the Viet-Nam government at 40%; whisky, only afforded by the rich, had practically no tax. Expensive perfume carried a 10% tax, that used normally by the average person—35%.

U. S. inspectors for the GAO also noted that South Viet-Nam—accustomed to cotton stockings—developed a yen for nylon when the U. S. began providing the funds.

e. 21,170

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Date: AUG 25 1964

Thoughts in Passing

IT'S LBJ ALL THE WAY in the Democratic National Convention, as has been expected from the outset. And the principal worry of Democratic leaders as President Johnson stands on the threshold of nomination for a full term is that complacency will induce the party faithful to give less than their best efforts in the November election campaign.

That Mr. Johnson is one of the most astute political leaders ever to appear on the Washington scene was demonstrated long before tragedy thrust him into the presidency. His control of the Senate during his service in that body was comparable to, if indeed it did not surpass, the legislative statesmanship of another great Texan, the late Sam Rayburn, for many years Speaker of the House.

Since going to the White House, Mr. Johnson has compiled a record in control and guidance of domestic affairs which provides a clear-cut choice for the electorate. This, however, contrasts sharply with continued mishandling and neglect of the nation's foreign relations. Retreat and defeat have been the rule for so long that a genuine triumph in diplomacy would be historic.

The present situation in South Vietnam, with another U.S.-supported regime collapsed under fire, disorders prevalent on a wide scale and reluctant native troops continuing to suffer major reverses at the hands of communist guerillas, is typical of what is going on in the world. And the latest doleful opinion to the effect that this is a hopeless struggle, voiced by a top representative of the Central Intelligence Agency, underscores the urgency of more serious prosecution of military action, if not a drastic change in course.

Acknowledging before the world inability to cope with communist guerilla bands in Vietnam would be the signal for endless aggression, beginning in the widely scattered areas where for some time Russian and Red Chinese have been stoking the fires of discontent and revolt, and extending most surely to other regions where the efforts have been more subtle.

The Department of State unquestionably is Mr. Johnson's greatest liability, and the fact that many of the policy-makers are career men beyond the reach of the chief executive is no cause for comfort. However, his designation of Thomas Mann to untangle the badly mishandled Latin American situation has begun to produce results and action along the same line in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East would greatly improve the LBJ image.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE has advanced to the point where hopes for improved public health and further expansion of normal life expectancy are regarded rather matter-of-factly. But areas will always remain which demand more attention than has been given them to date, and for the most part these are isolated examples of complacency which has generated neglect.

Statistics of the Pennsylvania Department of Health showing that Northumberland County has had an average of 45 diabetes deaths each year during the past decade, the second highest toll in the state, underscore the importance of tests for the detection of this malady,

especially since early treatment makes it manageable and spares the victims untold misery.

Perhaps the fact that diabetes tests have not been sufficiently dramatized is responsible for this condition. Most certainly an awareness of the importance of early discovery and treatment would materially change the present distressing situation.

Cancer detection has lagged for the reason that efforts have not been co-ordinated and the simple smear test which makes possible laboratory examinations without inconvenience or embarrassment remains almost unheard of. The Northumberland County Chapter of the American Cancer Society has been most cooperative in searching out cancer cases as well as in aiding treatment and research, and undoubtedly its full support would be given a more comprehensive detection program.

Resistance to such efforts because of an aversion to "mass" medication must sooner or later give way to a realization that public health comes first.

* * *

LIBERAL MYTHMAKERS James Reston and Joseph Alsop who, along with Walter Lippman have been having a field day with the Republican Party and its selections for President and Vice President, are getting their wires crossed in a way that, to them, must be most distressing.

Reston, writing in the New York Times a defense of that segment of the American press which unabashedly slants itself against Senator Goldwater, unwittingly clashed with Alsop, who, on that same day, burst forth on the theme that Goldwater no longer talks off the cuff because every time he does so, he pulls a boner.

Reston was hewing to the line that the news is not reported in a biased fashion by columnists including himself. Rather, he said, these writers are giving their opinions, hence are entitled to be one-sided. At the same time, however, he acknowledged that one news column had "misrepresented and hurt" Goldwater. This, he said, was when the Arizona senator remarked in answer to a question that one way to score in Vietnam was to use small nuclear weapons to defoliate a strip of jungle to deprive the communists of hidden camps and communications lines. Goldwater had prefaced the remark by saying it was not something he would do. That prefacing statement was omitted from the interview and thus arose the widely publicized but untrue report that Goldwater had proposed use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam jungles.

Reston admitted the justice of protests against this, but took umbrage at what he construed as the position of Goldwater supporters that columnists have no right to opinions opposed to theirs. Alsop's column on the same day Reston was pontificating along this line repeated the misrepresentation about the Goldwater stand on nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

So, if Reston is correctly interpreted, readers are supposed to allow for the fact that when Alsop reports what Goldwater said he is merely expressing his opinion as to what he said. Is this to be accepted as a fair sample of the opinion of "liberal" columnists?

* * *

WITH THE so-called liberals wanting more and more government, and the so-called conservatives wanting less and less, no wonder we're confused.

NASHVILLE, TENN.
BANNER

e. 95,980

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 29 1964

Is There A Policy?

Conduct Of Viet Nam War Is Major Campaign Issue

DELEGATES TO the Democratic National Convention had just nominated presidential and vice presidential candidates to do battle with the Republicans for the biggest political prize of them all when the Southeast Asia mess became an even bigger issue.

In the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon, terror roamed the streets. Buddhists and Roman Catholics were rioting, hacking each other to pieces with machetes.

After several days of blood-letting, Viet Nam army units, sorely needed in the guerrilla war with the Red Invaders to the north, restored a semblance of order.

And today Nguyen Xuan Oanh took over the reins of government as acting premier. He formerly served as head of Viet Nam economic affairs. The deposed president, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, continued as a figure in the caretaker government.

Khanh's regime was short-lived. But when he became chief of state, the Johnson administration waxed enthusiastic, hailing the move as strengthening Viet Nam's position.

A recent study of the situation by the Central Intelligence Agency which became public last week, noted that the Khanh regime lacked leadership, adding that "there is considerable serious doubt that victory can be won."

The report was made by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates.

This evaluation might very well mean that a "negotiated settlement" is in the making. The State Department, however, denies it represents policy. It was President de Gaulle of France who first suggested that the only way "to win" the Viet Nam war was to make a deal with the Communists and set up a neutralist form of government similar to that in Laos.

THAT "NASTY LITTLE WAR," as it has so aptly been described, hasn't been going at all well. More and more Americans, attached to Vietnamese units as advisers, were being killed, usually in ambush. The tactics of the Communists are to infiltrate South Viet Nam lines, raid and massacre, and then disappear into the rain forests. These hit-and-run forays are not calculated to seize and hold ground; their purpose is terrorism. The growing question among Americans is if the South Viet Nam people and government really have the stomach for this war, or do they expect the United States to ultimately come over in force?

The American public, wary of "police actions" of this sort, might well ask what the administration's policy is concerning Viet Nam, torn by internal strife and threatened by a full-scale invasion of Saigon. If a strategic plan exists it is a well-kept secret, obscured by statements that things are going well to reports that chances of victory are remote.

Stability has long been an important missing ingredient in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam. This means that it has been extremely difficult for U.S. advisers to advise, or get the cooperation needed to properly execute the war.

Certainly, the conduct of Southeast Asia affairs will become one of the major themes of the presidential campaign, along with other foreign policy issues such as the doorstep situation of Cuba and the weakening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There will be charges emanating from the Goldwater camp and explanations due from the LBJ forces.

DECATUR, ILL.
REVIEW

e. 29,666

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Date: AUG 26 1964

Another View of Viet Nam

AN OFFICIAL of the CIA has recently written concerning the Viet Nam situation that: "There remains serious doubt that victory can be won and the situation remains very fragile. If large scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained."

"There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

So stated Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's 112-man Board of National Estimates. The statements were contained in the group's June report on world trends.

Government sources made the Matthias report available to newsmen but stated that his findings do not represent the

government's point of view. It was stated that the United States was fully committed to stemming the Viet Cong insurgents and still believed that it could be done. It was further stated that there was no ground for negotiation with the Communists of South Viet Nam at the present time.

The possibility of some sort of neutralization as an alternative to the present situation in Viet Nam has long been a viable subject for discussion among European allies of the United States.

Despite the government's strong statement regarding the U.S. position in Viet Nam, it is interesting to speculate concerning what purpose could be served by the release of the Matthias study. One possibility is that it might be intended as a trial balloon, designed to sample current public feeling regarding the Viet Nam situation.

Wow! ←

**BIRMINGHAM, ALA.
NEWS**

c. 190,534
S. 224,207

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: **AUG 25 1964**

Dark Clouds Over Viet Nam

South Viet Nam is a patient who, despite everything U. S. "doctors" have prescribed, has resisted cure. Its condition, never better than critical, now appears to be taking a turn for the worse. President Khanh has bowed to rioters and resigned his top post. The situation as of now is disturbingly serious.

The anti-government and increasingly anti-American demonstrations and riots there in the past few days are graphic reminder that after five years of all-out effort by this country very little in the way of victory in the jungles or political stability in the capital has been accomplished.

Credit it to whatever you like: Attitudes of the Vietnamese themselves, lack of political leadership, Communist subversion and agitation—it all adds up to trouble. For whatever the causes of the increasing precariousness of our position there, the United States is literally unable, even if it wanted to do so, to pull out.

The situation is made the more depressing by publication of an analysis by a member of the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency—the body responsible for evaluating our intelligence reports—expressing doubt that we can ever win the war against the Viet Cong. It holds out "a prolonged stalemate" or "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization" as the best we can hope for.

Our government has indicated as a matter of national policy that neither of those alternatives is acceptable. Yet this analyst claims that even those things will be possible only if large-scale U. S. aid is continued and "if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented."

But at the very moment the report


is being discussed the political situation appears to be deteriorating rapidly.

Admittedly this is the view of just one member of the 12-man Board of National Estimates. But the chairman indicates that it has "general board approval."

It is a dismal prospect the document paints, made doubly so by inability of the Khanh government to achieve much more politically than the Diem regime.

U. S. aid will continue, of course, perhaps even be increased. But Americans must recognize that victory over communism in Southeast Asia will not be quick or painless. If it is to be won at all it will be won only after a long and costly struggle.

Under such conditions, our will to resist Communist expansion at whatever cost will be thoroughly tested. We should be prepared mentally as well as strategically for the challenge.



In Viet Nam . . . Riots

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 26 1964

No Victory in Sight**CIA Advice on Viet Nam**

Publication this week of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report on Viet Nam has added an important new element to appraisal of the war in South-east Asia — all the more so in view of the deterioration of the Khanh regime since Monday as a result of riots in Saigon and other parts of South Viet Nam.

The CIA evaluation, made in June, was that there is "serious doubt that victory can be won" and that at best "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved. The report looks to "some kind of negotiated settlement based on neutralization."

Status of the report is somewhat vague. The document was released, after a leak, as a means of denying that it represents Johnson administration policy. Nonetheless, the report represents the considered judgment of the ranking study group with CIA and it is said to reflect an unofficial estimate "widely held in government and the subject of recurrent official discussion."

☆☆☆

Undoubtedly it is as clear to the North Viet Nam and Chinese Communists as it is to the CIA that after five years of guerrilla war "no end appears in sight." The Communists know that their terrorist attacks can maintain an atmosphere of insecurity. But they can have no illusions that they, anymore than the South Vietnamese, can achieve final military victory.

The time has come to check again to see if there is any real desire, mutually, to establish a truly neutral Viet Nam with enforceable devices for keeping both

North and South independent. Two arguments have been made in the past against similar proposals.

One is that a negotiated peace would open the way to a Communist takeover unless there were ironclad guarantees of South Viet Nam's independence. (Some hold that ironclad guarantees of this kind don't exist.) The other argument against a negotiated peace at this time is that impressive military victories are needed first to enable the anti-Communist forces to negotiate from strength.

☆☆☆

The guarantee needed to enforce a settlement must be an integral part of any agreement. But the possibilities in that direction, if any, won't be known as long as the American position is that any such conference is a waste of time.

As for negotiating from strength, the Communists must have got the message from the U.S. naval retaliation in the Gulf of Tonkin. This has been generally regarded as an adequate and effective demonstration of strength.

Unquestionably, some backstage exploration is under way to test the mood of the Communists in regard to a negotiated peace that can be enforced.

It is probably unrealistic, however, to expect that any overt efforts along this line will be made until after the U.S. presidential election is over.

It is a certainty, too, that Red China will have to demonstrate a strong desire for an enforceable truce, or there will be none.

BLOOMINGTON, ILL.
PANTAGRAPH

e. 43,045
S. 38,777

Front Edit Other
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AUG 26 1964

Date:

Bad to Worse in Viet Nam

The boiling-over political situation in South Viet Nam, coupled with a Central Intelligence agency "can't win" study paper, adds new confusion to an already chaotic world hot spot.

The State Department acted quickly to disavow the CIA report, which expressed "serious doubt" that the Communists could be subdued in South Viet Nam and suggested that the U.S. might have to settle for a "negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

The Department, at the same time, attempted to pick up the new political strings loosed by the resignation of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, military strongman who has been ruling as a dictator under a state of emergency declared after the Gulf of Tonkin shooting.

The CIA's report was made available to newsmen by unidentified Administration sources, but the authorization must have come from President Johnson. While the spokesman made clear that

the study did not represent the government's view, release of the report can be viewed as little less than a trial balloon.

It remains to be seen whether the study heralds a change in direction in our relations with South Viet Nam.

It is obvious, and has been for some time, that the Viet Nam military picture is steadily worsening. Basic to the lack of success against the Viet Cong has been the lack of support from most of the country for the Saigon government.

Kanh's stepping down as president, and the pledge of a civilian-dominated ruling junta, may halt the Buddhist-led riots in the cities, but probably will not rally the mass of South Vietnamese to the war effort.

If the situation is allowed to deteriorate further, even the CIA's appraisal of the situation may be obsolete. The time for negotiation will have passed and withdrawal may be the only choice.

**PORT CHESTER, N. Y.
ITEM**

e. 15,769

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Date: **AUG 26 1964**

Travail In South Vietnam

IT IS MUCH too early to discern what effect the mob-forced resignation of President Nguyen Khanh will have on the prosecution of the South Vietnam war effort or the course of government in that far-off land to which United States prestige is so intimately connected.

Whatever the immediate result, one can be sure that the new political turmoil raises grave questions in the minds of Americans, who already have sacrificed 182 of their sons in conflict in support of that disturbed nation.

THE IMPRESSION increasingly grows that we are in a situation from which we cannot hope to escape unsullied, if we can escape at all.

In the name of democracy, we have been pouring out men and money to keep South Vietnam from being overrun by Communists.

YET, we're not doing a very good job of it. Disturbing reports tell of repeated gains by the Red Viet Cong guerrillas in jungle battles, arrogant invasions of hamlets and cities by terrorists, and continued demonstration of the lack of rapport between government and the people.

Add to all this the disclosure of a CIA "study paper", which supports a negotiated settlement looking toward a neutralized South Vietnam, and we become even more perplexed.

ARE WE INDULGING in de-

fensive wars only to demean ourselves? Have we accepted the proposition that we must not win any brushfire conflict in Asia? Do we intend to combat aggression with mere show of force? What really is going on over there?

If we've been committed to some sinister set of fighting rules under which the South Vietnamese won't fight and we can't, under which the populace can be whipped into a frenzy and governmental regimes can be brought down any time provocateurs are set loose, under which our courage goes unquestioned but our might and will are ridiculed — then it seems time we started drawing up a new set of rules that will make sense to the American people.

CHARLOTTE, N. C.
NEWS

e. 62,153

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Date: AUG 26 1964

A Strange Document

The American people are forced now to view the crisis in South Vietnam on two distinct levels. The first, or official, level comprises broadened American involvement in the defense of South Vietnam and official statements underlining a determination either to win the war there or give this nation the leverage of power it will need in any eventual negotiations.

The second level is a gloomy report on South Vietnam recently drawn up by the ~~Central Intelligence Agency~~ and released over the weekend by the State Department.

Although officials emphasized that it did not reflect official U.S. policy, the study was made by an important agency and released in its entirety for public consumption. It speaks of the "floundering, inhibited" nature of the anti-Communist struggle and raises doubts that victory can ever be won there. "If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented," said the report, "at least a stalemate can be attained."

In other words, if things go fairly well for the United States in South Vietnam, stalemate occurs. If things do not go

well, the possibility of negotiated settlements and subsequent neutralization of the area occur. This is gloomy thinking indeed. In light of the White House's emphasis on greater involvement in South Vietnam's defense and a stepped-up offensive against the Viet Cong, what is the CIA document supposed to be — a trial balloon or merely another sign of Washington's ambivalence toward a complex situation?

American officials speak of one day erecting a cordon sanitaire along the boundary separating North and South Vietnam, cutting off rebel Communist forces from their suppliers in the North. They speak of ultimate social reform in South Vietnam, of the need for infusing the Saigon government with stability, and always of the determination in Washington not to be the weak sister France was when that nation was negotiated out of Southeast Asia altogether in 1954.

If the speeches are to be believed, the defense of South Vietnam has become a matter of principle, similar in kind to the decision to remain in West Berlin.

Then suddenly, an interior Washington document purporting doom rises to the surface — timed, it would seem, to render foolish all of the high resolves. What are the American people to expect?

ROANOKE, VA.
TIMES

m. 55,233
S. 93,957

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Date: AUG 25 1964

The Mess in Viet Nam

Regimes in South Viet Nam have been overthrown three times in the past ten months. The political instability of the country is the core of the mess in which the United States is involved. There is scarcely any hope that American military aid, now being stepped up, can turn the tide of war against the Communists as long as the people have no confidence in their government and are so distracted by domestic discord that they fail to see the threat from the external enemy.

Street demonstrations and mob violence have toppled General Khanh from the presidency and apparently from his position as virtual dictator. What happens now — whether Khanh continues as a factor in the government and retains his command of the Vietnamese army — is uncertain. One thing is certain; however. As long as there is no government capable of unifying the people, as long as a regime can be overthrown at the whim of mobs, there is no hope of turning back the Viet Cong guerrillas.

Victory is a dim prospect even if a viable government could be established. This view is reflected in the Central Intelligence Agency assessment, which a "leak" brought to public attention, being followed by a denial that it reflected the opinion of the Washington Administration. That assessment was that after five years of fighting "no end appears in

sight," with the suggestion of "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

The Administration has not been frank with the American people about the deterioration of the Vietnamese situation. While most authorities are convinced that neither side can win the jungle war, Washington maintains the official attitude that to negotiate a settlement guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of South Viet Nam is out of the question. Meanwhile, American lives continue to be sacrificed in a military stalemate.

The question is whether there is some real chance through diplomacy to save Viet Nam's independence and to provide enforceable guarantees. An Administration facing an election is anxious to avoid an accusation of negotiating with the Communists for peace. After the votes are counted in November the necessity of reckoning with politics will be less acute. The CIA report, despite the denial that it represents Administration thinking, may be prophetic of an abrupt turn in American policy.

ALBUQUERQUE, N. M.

JOURNAL

m. 52,447

S. 74,010

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Date: AUG 25 1964

ANOTHER KOREA?

Central Intelligence Agency has issued a document concerning the floundering effort in South Viet Nam that appears to be a blueprint for another Korea.

William Matthias, of CIA's Board of National Estimates, in the document had this appraisal of the U.S.-backed conflict against Communist guerrillas: "There remains serious doubt that victory can be won... If large-scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country... could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization..."

High administration officials now claim the document does not represent U.S. policy. They assert the paper never has been presented to, or considered by, President Johnson's National Security Council, nor the top level U.S. Intelligence Estimate Board.

But it is significant that the document, written early this year, has been circulated among government agencies with a notation it had "general approval" of the CIA board. Officials sources disclosed existence of the document after learning it had been offered as a major outline of American policy.

The same sources deny this and declare the document's ideas were "only one man's opinion."

But there are some disturbing questions. Why was the document allowed to circulate for so long among other agencies, with the "approval" notation, if it represented "only one man's opinion?" Also disturbing is its authorship by a high official of an agency which has been repeatedly under fire for attempting to shape foreign policy, a function of the chief executive and his State Department.

The document unfortunately could serve to give some credence to the charges that the administration has embarked on a "no-win" policy in South Viet Nam despite repeated denials.

DUBUQUE, IOWA
TELEGRAPH-HERALD

e. 40,181
S. 41,091

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 24 1964

Jungle Dilemma

Barry Goldwater was hooted from coast to coast when he declared that victory in Vietnam would depend on our successful destruction of supply lines from North Vietnam. He was accused of proposing to "defoliate" the jungles with radioactive materials.

If we disregard the political attacks and examine the problem itself, we may conclude that there can be no victory for us in Vietnam unless we do cut off their supplies, by whatever method that is practical.

Every day the evidence piles high that we can't win a jungle war with the Communists. We can't fight that way successfully, and the enemy can.

Willard Matthias, of the Central Intelligence Agency, said Monday: "There is serious doubt that victory can be won. At best, a prolonged stalemate might be achieved."

And from Saigon Monday came new reports of intensified reaction against the U.S.A. and local government by mobs of students, proving the inability of the South Vietnamese to show a solid front.

An Associated Press dispatch from Saigon dramatically illustrates our inferiority in this kind of war: "More than 1,000 Vietnamese troops moved into the Black Virgin Mountain territory, a backyard for the Viet Cong, and got lost!"

One group lost contact with the others for an entire day in staggering blindly through jungle thickets.

"The Viet Cong," said an American adviser, "could pick us off like flies" if they could find the wandering soldiers. Patrolling troops ran upon the site where government soldiers were recently ambushed. There were 75 fresh graves.

"It may take something like a miracle before we can get at the enemy in there, and hurt him," the American adviser continued.

This jungle, out of which Viet Cong Communists emerge to strike unexpectedly, is only 60 miles from Saigon.

It seems obvious that even a large scale American land operation would be hopelessly inadequate to defeat this kind of elusive enemy.

We can continue to lose this war, month by month, or take one of two alternatives: bomb out supply bases on the Vietnam borders, and risk Red China's retaliation, or, secondly, accept neutrality, which would also bring the Red Chinese in, but with less shooting.

We are so inextricably involved in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian struggles that withdrawal, at best, can only be a slow process. But it should be a warning against getting involved similarly in Africa. Signs that we might do just that come from the Congo, where we seem to be taking over what the United Nations failed to accomplish.

Senator Mike Mansfield, Democratic majority leader, issued a statement Saturday warning us against our cultivating this tendency. "The history of Africa," he declared, "is one of European involvement. It would be most unfortunate if we were drawn into the internecine warfare of the Congolese."

And he added, pointedly and wisely, "We must resist the urge to try to solve every problem wherever it crops out."

WASHINGTON, D. C.
NATIONAL OBSERVER

Monday 205,878

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Date: AUG 31 1964

The Memo That Produced a Furor

A View of a World in Disorder

◆ Last week the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made public a controversial 45-page memorandum called "Trends in the World Situation," written by Willard Matthias of the CIA's Board of National Estimates. The 12-member board's function is to prepare "think pieces concerned with broad assessment of the world situation."

The document was released after a section of it leaked to the press. That section expressed doubt that victory can be won in Vietnam. The State Department, apparently fearing Republicans would raise a political furor over the document, contended that it was not an official statement of Administration policy.

Following are excerpts from the memorandum:

The Threat of War

The decade of the 1950s witnessed fundamental changes in the structure of world power. . . . By the end of that decade, in contrast to its beginning, the U.S. no longer enjoyed military invulnerability, unchallengeable world power, or unique economic superiority. It was clear that the world was entering upon a new era. Not only was there a new political and military relation between the major powers, but new leaders were arriving upon the scene, political and social instability had become epidemic in the southern two-thirds of the world, and schisms and heresies were appearing within the Communist camp itself.

The U.S. possesses greater striking power than the USSR and could wreak much greater damage in the USSR than the latter could in the U.S. Nevertheless . . . a general nuclear war—whether brought about by design, accident, or miscalculation—would kill many millions of people, destroy the capital accumulations of many decades, render large sections of the earth uninhabitable, and destroy the power of most of the modern nations of the world.

In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a military force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself from unacceptable damage. . . . Thus if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop and measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of forces will deter and that another will not. Deterrence is a mental state, and it depends to a preponderant degree not upon a precise level of force, but upon a variety of other factors, such as how the party to be deterred estimates the military forces arrayed against him and the balance of military power, how desperately he wants to achieve a given objective, how he estimates the chances of a political confrontation leading to hostilities, and how he estimates the chances of hostilities leading to a general conflict.

The Cuba Crisis

The Soviets probably undertook this initiative either in the expectation that the U.S. would accept it, or in the belief that the U.S. reaction could not be so accurately predicted as to preclude making the effort. . . . The U.S. had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition, the U.S. had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics, and the U.S. had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos. United States formal statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty. . . .

Thus it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the U.S. was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its

Continued

consequences, and perhaps therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance.

The rapidity and magnitude of U.S. mobilization after the missile installations were identified, and the firmness and sureness with which President Kennedy dealt with both Khrushchev and Castro no doubt surprised both; the misconceptions of the Soviets were dissolved. . . . Thus the Cuban missile crisis helped to reduce the uncertainties or misapprehensions under which the Soviets had operated. The effect is likely to persist for some time. . . . But some uncertainty will always exist.

The Cuban affair following upon the failure of other Soviet foreign policy initiatives of the past few years must have caused the Soviet leaders to become somewhat disillusioned about the utility of the strategic military power which they had striven so hard to acquire. . . .

The Communist World

We can confidently expect that communism in the future will come to possess still less doctrinal uniformity than it now has. Indeed, the national and doctrinal antagonisms which exist may occasionally lead to armed conflict; the Communist world may come to be as diverse and undisciplined as the non-Communist world.

While the grave economic problems which China faces may in time destroy the regime as we know it, they are not all to be attributed to the policies which the Communist regime has adopted. Any regime would have staggered under the enormous problems of population and food supply. By contrast, the economic problems which the USSR confronts are tractable, but it is still uncertain that the USSR can solve them without fundamental changes in its ideological outlook.

Europe and de Gaulle

. . . . The readiness of France to accept a national leader, the strengthened national consensus in West Germany, and the successful creation of a Socialist-Catholic coalition in Italy reflect what appears to be a new desire not to get bogged down in ideological debate, a recognition that revolution might destroy more than it accomplished, and a willingness to accept society's institutions as a basis for going ahead with progress and reform.

The new European attitudes have also given a somewhat greater respectability to the Communist states of Eastern Europe and to the Marxist parties of the West. . . . In general, (they have) stirred new hopes that an East-West accommodation can somehow be developed which will enable Europe as a whole to live in peace and prosperity.

by his neighbors, but they have increasingly come to share some of his precepts—particularly . . . his preachments that Europe can and must develop its own power and solve its own problems. Nevertheless, not de Gaulle and still less his neighbors are ready to hazard their own security by destroying NATO.

They have believed, and continue to believe, that the principal problem of the alliance is to strengthen its deterrent effect by providing a greater measure of European control over its military forces and particularly over its nuclear strategic arm.

They do not want the U.S. to be defeated or humbled outside Europe, but neither do they wish the U.S. to create, or allow itself to be confronted with, issues of critical character outside Europe. They are inclined to believe that the U.S. makes too much of Latin American, African, and Far Eastern problems . . . and that steps should be taken to minimize, to quiet, or to neutralize them.

Latin America and Castro

Nearly everywhere in Latin America there is a high degree of political instability; the combination of strong pressure for change from growing numbers of dissatisfied people, revolutionary plotting, and the very difficult economic problems which most countries have kept the political pot boiling and will continue to do so for many years to come.

Some of the leftist-nationalist forces may succeed in acquiring power. Those revolutionaries who take Castro as their model, inspiration, or guide will exploit whatever opportunities are open to them. . . . The presence in the Western Hemisphere of a Communist state backed by the USSR will continue greatly to jeopardize U.S. interests throughout the continent and to complicate the problems of U.S. diplomacy.

Chaos in Africa

The situation in Africa is at least as unstable as that in Latin America, but considerably less suffused with a disposition toward revolutionary change. . . . Plotting and violence occur, but . . . their aim is usually simply to replace those enjoying the privileges of office by others who would like those privileges themselves. Often the atmosphere of political developments is that of the comic opera rather than that of social crisis.

By and large, the drift seems to be toward political and social chaos. Although revolutionary forces of a serious and dangerous character remain largely undeveloped or unmobilized, the milieu is one in which these forces may become suddenly generated and difficult to control. The area is certainly becoming increasingly vulnerable to meddling from the outside.

While turmoil will continue as the Arabs quarrel among themselves, the chances are good that this turmoil will not spill over into conflicts likely to be seriously damaging or critical for Western interests.

Deterioration in Vietnam

The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, depending largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever. The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary. There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale U.S. support continues, and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization.

Uncertainty in Indonesia

Larger stakes are involved in the contest between Indonesia and Malaysia. . . . They (the Indonesians) hope to make Indonesia a great world power able to negotiate in equality with China, the USSR, and the U.S. — after having destroyed Malaysia. The outcome seems likely to remain uncertain for years to come.

A Pluralistic World Order

The fact that the two great powers have found it difficult to bring their very substantial military power to bear to achieve their objectives . . . has deterred the major powers from undertakings which might call their military capabilities into action. This in turn has enhanced the role of discussion, diplomacy, and negotiation at the great-power level. . . .

A pluralistic world order is rapidly coming into being. World power is proliferating, divergencies are emerging, and diversity has been encouraged.

The strategic situation in the world does not make general nuclear war impossible, but it makes it a highly irrational method of solving international disputes. The fact that the Communist world has become undisciplined will not force it to abandon its objective, but it makes progress more difficult and inhibitions more compulsive. Discord within the West is not destroying NATO or undermining

non-Communist world, it is forcing Western nations to recognize the underlying diversity of their concerns. The rise of independent nationalism and centers of power outside the North Atlantic basin does not foreshadow a great decline in Western influence, but it does greatly reduce the chances that Western political concepts will gain wide acceptance.

The Overriding Problem

In the months following the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev was apparently under some attack at home and apparently won his battle. . . . The result was a decision to hold the line on defense expenditures, a determination to stand fast against Chinese and Chinese-inspired attacks upon Soviet policies, and a decision to seek better relations with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. While this stance may persist for some time to come . . . it does not in itself signal a broader withdrawal of the USSR from its basically hostile attitude toward the West or from its revolutionary goals.

Despite changes in the world situation and in the manner in which the world's leaders look upon it, the danger of a general nuclear war with all its horrible consequences will continue to be the overriding problem of our time. This danger will continue to arise, as in the past, not from a deliberate attempt to destroy a competitor, but from undertakings and occurrences of a more limited character.

Clandestine Activities

The situation in most of the underdeveloped world is so disorderly that many situations are likely to develop from which the great powers will have difficulty remaining aloof, or which they will have difficulty controlling if they do get involved. . . . Once outside powers do become involved, whether by accident or design, crises can develop which will engage their prestige to a degree incommensurate with the intrinsic or strategic value of the area itself.

One consequence of this disorder and of the inhibitions upon open involvement is likely to be an increase in clandestine activities designed to influence the course of events. This will be an attractive course of action, not only because of the inhibitions upon open intervention, but because it will often cost so little in money and effort if an investment is made early enough to be effective.

East-West Relations

It is possible in the present context of Soviet policy . . . that some movement toward the settlement of some international issues will occur. But the obstacles to a general *detente* are very great, not only because of the key character of such problems as Berlin, but because of the new tensions and problems which will arise from the disorderly character of so much of the world.

AUG 31 1964

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Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 23 1964

AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS STUDYING SECRET REPORT

Russia Bidding for U.S. Friendship?

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 — Foreign policy planners of the United States are studying a top-level intelligence report depicting Russia as an increasingly amiable power, open to peaceful settlement of international disputes.

This "Russia is mellowing" theory went into temporary eclipse after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Evidence that it is again thriving in the highest circles of the Johnson administration has been obtained by Chicago Tribune Press Service.

A 47-page report dated Feb. 19, 1964, and marked "secret" has been circulated in the White House, National Security Council, State, and Defense departments.

Based on reports gathered by the worldwide espionage network of the Central Intelligence Agency, it was prepared and endorsed by the Board of National Estimates of that agency.

It argues that the Soviet Union, under the impact of economic stress and difficulties with Red China, is losing its hostility to the West and is seeking a new kind of relationship with the United States.

This comforting theme brushes off the bellicose threats of Nikita Khrushchev as a kind of international campaign oratory.

Khrushchev, the report asserts, has made a decision to negotiate better relations with the United States. The source of this information is not disclosed.

Despite the establishment of a Soviet outpost in Cuba and Communist subversion and terrorism in Africa, the Far East and South America, the report expresses the belief that Russia will diminish "the vigor of its revolutionary effort outside."

What to Do About Russia
Page 13.

the Communist world" in the future.

A dark picture was drawn of the situation in Viet Nam where "there remains serious doubt that victory can be won" and a "prolonged stalemate" is the most to be anticipated. The report hints that "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization" is the only solution.

If the Communist world has its troubles, they are matched by similar developments in the West, the paper asserts. Europe regards the United States as overdramatizing its problems in Latin America and the Far East. American influence in Europe is waning.

The report has a covering memorandum signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates of

the CIA. He noted that the contents, entitled "Trends in the World Situation" had been twice revised and supplemented after board discussion. The report had received "general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point of it." It was being "circulated for information" on a classified basis.

The Board of Estimates of the CIA submits its findings to the United States Intelligence Board which operates within the National Security Council structure. The council is headed by President Johnson, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as its leading members.

The conduct of the cold war is necessarily affected by the "estimates" of enemy intentions prepared by the board after examination of reports

from a multitude of CIA agents abroad. Kent, the chairman, is former head of the State Department's office of research and intelligence and chief of the Europe-Africa division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II.

The theme that Russia is evolving into a potential ally, having abandoned its goal of world conquest, was advanced more than two years ago in a secret strategy guide compiled by Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's policy planning board.

Disclosure of the Rostow report by Chicago Tribune Press Service in June 1962, caused a storm in Congress and the questioning of Rostow in secret session. He invoked "executive privilege" to avoid comment on a classified document. The State Department declared that

Continued

the published report had been garbled and distorted.

Four months later, the late President Kennedy and Khrushchev were confronting each other in a crisis aroused by the discovery of missiles in Cuba. Talk about Russia's peaceful intentions subsided for a time but in June 1963, Kennedy again was calling for a change of attitude toward the Soviet Union.

There followed in 1963 the nuclear test-ban treaty and the credit sale of wheat to Russia, and in 1964 the proposal for a bilateral consular convention between Russia and the United States.

The new report under study by the policy-planners argues that the stand taken by Kennedy in the Cuban affair disillusioned Soviet leaders about the usefulness of military power in international disputes. It suggested that the possession of military power was no longer a predominant factor in foreign policy.

This contention, implying advocacy of a negative defense policy intended to maintain the status quo while Russia evolves into a peace-loving state, has met with spirited opposition in some government circles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the time of the nuclear test-ban hearings, prepared a position paper which stated flatly that "militant communism remains dedicated to the destruction of our society."

Summarizing its survey of "world trends," the CIA document remarks:

"It is possible in the present context of Soviet policy—particularly to the extent that this policy derives from the U.S.S.R.'s appreciation of the military situation and from its own difficulties at home and within the Communist world—that some movement toward the settlement of some international issues will occur."

The obstacles to a "general detente" (widespread relaxation of tensions) remained very great, the paper conceded, because of such problems as Berlin and "the new tensions and problems which will arise from the disorderly character of so much of the world."

Over the "longer run," however, the paper continued, "we continue to believe that the gradual changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. will diminish its hostility to the West and the

vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the Communist world.

"In particular, the climate of opinion within the U.S.S.R., the greater intellectual opinion and popular preoccupations with peace and a better life, the greater weight accorded to national interests and conventional modes of international conduct—all these have already contributed to the decline of Soviet aggressiveness and to a realistic appreciation of the nature of the modern world.

"This process of change may be slowed from time to time, or even halted, but it is probably irreversible. But whether it proceeds or halts, the evolution which has taken place, together with the changes which have occurred within the Communist camp and in the world at large, suggest that for the next several years at least the world may be replete with strife and disorder but not on the verge of nuclear disaster."

The introduction to the secret document notes that fundamental changes in the structure of world power during the decade of the 1950's brought about a new era in the 1960s.

Red Economic Problems

"Among the new tendencies are mounting economic difficulties in the Communist states, the increasing effort of the Soviet leaders to inject a new atmosphere into U.S.-Soviet relations, and the readiness of the current European leaders to undertake broader political experiments at home and to explore new programs and policies abroad.

"Moreover, the new style brought by President Kennedy to the conduct of foreign relations, the erection of the Berlin wall, the Cuban crisis of October 1962, the death of President Kennedy and the succession of Lyndon Johnson were all major international events which have had a profound effect upon international relationships."

The CIA paper discussed the world situation under four major headings dealing with military power, the problems of the Communist world, the non-Communist world and the under developed areas.

Although the United States possesses greater striking power than Russia and could wreak much greater damage on the foe than the latter could in the United States, the size, armament and operational capabilities of opposing military

forces are no longer crucial questions, the paper argued.

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival," it stated. "Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop and measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of forces will deter and that another will not. Deterrence is a mental state and it depends to a preponderant degree, not upon a precise level of forces but upon a variety of other factors such as how the party to be deterred estimates the military forces arrayed against him..."

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the paper declared, was forced by Soviet leaders who probably regard the United States, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, as "uncertain and cautious." This nation also had accepted, "with little more than verbal pyrotechnics," the erection of the Berlin wall and the neutralist solution in Laos.

Cuba Stand Surprises

Both Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro were doubtlessly surprised by President Kennedy's stand in the Cuban affair, the paper said, and President Johnson has stressed the "continuity" of United States policy.

The Cuban affair must have caused "Soviet leaders to become somewhat disillusioned about the utility of the strategic military power which they had striven so hard to acquire."

"We do not mean to imply that military power in the hands of the great powers or of the lesser ones has become or is becoming a matter of minor importance in international politics," the document noted. "The Soviet leaders may have become somewhat disillusioned about the value of their strategic power in the resolution of disputes... but possession of military power remains a major, though perhaps not a predominant, factor in determining a nation's role in the world stage."

The problems within the Communist world are not only obvious but spectacular, the paper asserted. It noted the "open quarrel" between Red China and Russia; the economic failure in China and the Russian need to buy wheat.

"Moscow's influence remains substantial but its authority has greatly diminished. First Yugoslavia and then China exhibited the phenomenon of heresy allied to national power and Moscow was unable to compel obedience. Soviet growth rates have declined. Livestock is being prematurely slaughtered. China is much worse off.

"Soviet economic problems have contributed to some greater prudence in Soviet policy and particularly to the current Soviet efforts to create a more friendly atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations."

Disunity In West

But the "disunity, indiscipline and decline in ideology" in the Communist world have been

matched, the paper declared, by similar developments in the West. The Atlantic alliance has suffered and American influence in Europe has been reduced. In disputes between the Communist world and the United States, European nations "do not want the United States to be defeated or humbled outside Europe but neither do they wish the United States to create... issues of a critical character outside Europe."

"They are inclined," the paper stated, "to believe that the United States makes too much of Latin-American, African and Far Eastern problems, that it overdramatizes them and makes them more significant than they really are and that steps should be taken to minimize, to quiet, or to neutralize them."

"France in particular, but the United Kingdom and the others to some degree also, would prefer to calm the situation in the Far East by dealing with China, North Viet Nam and North Korea..."

The paper was pessimistic about the future of new states in Africa. Many more eruptions

Continued

of violence were approved and large, the drift seems to be toward political and social chaos."

Gloomy over Viet Nam

The document was almost despairing in its consideration of the problem in Viet Nam:

"The guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is entering its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south... under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever..."

"The counterguerrilla effort continues to flounder... there remains serious doubt that victory can be won and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and development upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Discussing "implications of the new relations of power," the paper asserted that Russia and the United States are both finding their roles as world powers in decline.

"The Soviet leaders themselves appear to have come to a new appreciation of the world situation," the paper declared. "In the months following the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev was apparently under some attack at home and apparently won his battle. The result was a decision... to seek better relations with the West in general and the United States in particular."

Word of Caution


The paper cautiously added that this friendly attitude toward the United States, while it might persist for some time did not signal "a broader withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from its

basically hostile attitude toward the West or from its revolutionary goals."

But the Soviet leaders, the paper asserts, were encouraged by President Kennedy's "style and approach... to seek a new kind of relationship with the United States."

The danger of nuclear war remained, the paper warned, and the problem regarding its risks will continue to be "the overriding problem of our time."

"Nevertheless," it continued, "the problems which will increasingly preoccupy policymakers will be those which arise from the proliferation of power which has occurred. Problems such as Cyprus, East Africa and Panama may be quieted down by steps now being taken but others like them will flare up in the many places which continue to be unstable. "... the situation in most of the underdeveloped world is so disorderly that many situations are likely to develop from which the great powers will have difficulty in remaining aloof..."



—AP Wirephoto

EUROPE THINKS U.S. PAYS TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO TURMOIL, SAYS POLICY REVIEW
Demonstrators Outside Leopoldville Scream Anti-American Slogans, Denounce Aid to Tshombe

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Date AUG 29 1964

Our Allies Steer Clear of Viet Nam

By Seymour Freidin

LONDON.

Henry Cabot Lodge, suave and cheery of mien on the outside and heavy of heart on the inside, is embarked on the most fruitless, thankless assignment of present-day diplomacy.

In the somnolent, vacation-bound capitals of Western Europe, he is explaining American policy in Viet Nam. Nearly every step of the way another argument is torn from his lips to vanish into embarrassed silence just as when Gen. Khanh was compelled to resign.

Not only of importance among our European allies is listening—as they privately say after Lodge leaves. Everybody who is anybody is inclined to mutter that we told you so, when some fresh disaster rolls over South Viet Nam. They also declare that none of their governments will ever get mixed up in the desperate conflict.

They haven't bought the de Gaulle grand plan for neutralizing old Indochina. For one thing, most of Western Europe doesn't care for the Gaullist sweep and shape of things so long as France's own interests are not directly involved. But they are alarmed at the endless possibilities of the mixed-up conflict in Viet Nam. A Communist victory is abhorrent to them. At the same time, though, they want the fighting to stop through some miracle solution.

When Lodge began his exercise in personal, peripatetic diplomacy at the behest of the President, Gen. Khanh had just about taken over all political control in South Viet Nam. It was nothing to worry about, observed Lodge in Europe. In Southeast Asia, that sort of thing happens all the time.

In a year, of course, that kind of power move has occurred four times in South Viet Nam, if you count Khanh's latest debacle. It makes Lodge's persuasive efforts to build up a little more conviction for American policy even less fruitful. Hard headed men of state say they understand. But they won't contribute a man or even, in quite a few cases, an extra nickel.

Over in Bonn, for example, Chancellor Erhard allowed as how he might provide a little more economic aid to South Viet Nam. The West German contribution to date has been around \$23 million. A drop in the bucket, you might say, compared with what the U. S. expends in blood and treasure.

Nevertheless, it is lots more than any other European ally has contributed or offered. With Erhard's putative pledge, the suspicion lingers about whether the promise is to help us out, even symbolically, or to needle de Gaulle.

In the midst of all the rapid and important person-to-person confrontation, Lodge also has been plagued by the special CIA report which says the war in Viet Nam is, at best, a stalemate. From their own reports

about three months ago, most European allies obtained the same conclusions, which were published in this newspaper.

Over on this side of the Atlantic, they want desperately an end to fighting in Viet Nam. They are torn by the escalation possibilities and, thereby, having the super-power of the West getting them willy-nilly into the war.

Neutralizing the whole area seems the best to them of all the dire possibilities. What happens, though, if the neutralized territories are soon swallowed up by Communist power? You get no substantive responses, as I experienced recently with some men who are steadfast in keeping charter membership in NATO.

Rather, they turn immediately to something much closer to home—Cyprus, let's say. Let us try and solve that soon is the sort of loose riposte. It may be that this is a parochial view. One wise and highly practical statesman remarked privately that a non-super power cannot afford to have an international super-power view. That, he added, is for the U. S. and we must stand the heat as other great powers have in history.

We may not welcome or even sympathize with such an outlook. It is, however, present and quite ubiquitous, even self-defeating. For Henry Cabot Lodge this is the galling failure of a mission, no matter how shiny a gloss is put on the finished report.

Deletions in CIA Report Bared

See Attempt to Lessen Study Value

BY WILLARD EDWARDS
(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, Aug. 31 — The state department, in releasing a secret central intelligence agency study for publication Aug. 23, made a significant deletion in a covering memorandum, it was learned today. The apparent purpose of the omission was to downgrade the importance of the document as a government paper representing official opinion.

Only a few changes were made in the body of the report. With one or two exceptions, they were not of major import.

Acts to Avoid Scoop

These alterations were noted in a comparison of the original CIA survey of "Trends in the World Situation," dated Feb. 19, 1964, and the second, updated to June 8, which was released to a selected group of reporters on Friday, Aug. 21.

The state department said it was taking this unusual action, removing the "secret" label from a paper prepared by the CIA, the nation's espionage branch, because it had learned that its contents were to be published the following Sunday by THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE.

Administration officials emphasized that the secret paper did not reflect official foreign policy. It was described as "a thought-provoking" composition by one individual, Willard Matthias, and a "think piece" typical of many distributed thru government agencies.

Key Phrase Deleted

This statement did not accord with a covering memorandum attached to the original document, signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the CIA's board of national estimates. Kent noted that the paper had received general board approval and has been twice revised and supplemented after board discussion.

This latter phrase, disclosing that the study was more than the opinion of one official and had received board approval after careful scrutiny and debate on two occasions, resulting in revision and additions, was deleted from the Kent memorandum when the entire document was released to the press.

In updating the released paper by six months, the government made few changes in its

wording. Some merely adjusted the time element, changing such phrases as "in recent months" to "within the last year."

Keep Viet Evaluation

There was no change in the despairing estimate of the problem in South Viet Nam, with its conclusion that "no end is in sight," that a "prolonged stalemate" was the most to be anticipated, and suggesting that there was a chance for "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Nor was there any alteration in the top-level intelligence report which suggested that Russia in the future will diminish the "vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the communist world."

One paragraph deleted from the original paper read as follows:

"Pope Paul's visit to the Holy Land and the reception accorded him by the leaders and peoples of the eastern churches, has further spurred the ecumenical movement and contributed to the growing feeling that progress without radical change is possible not only within Europe but within all Christendom."

Foreign Influence Deleted

No reason was advanced for elimination of this statement.

In another section, discussing "a high degree of political instability" in Latin America,

the paper had referred to "revolutionary plotting, some of it stimulated from abroad."

The phrase, "some of it stimulated from abroad," was deleted. Presumably, it did not accord with the "Russia is mellowing" theme which permeated the document.

A reference to the "Arab-Israeli dispute" as one of the causes of world tension also was deleted.

New problem for U.S.

Hopes fade for South Vietnam

As rioters force strong-man Khanh out of presidency,
it becomes harder for Administration to win war
against Vietcong. Leaked CIA report hints at negotiations

The resignation this week of South Vietnamese strong man, Nguyen Khanh, from his newly acquired job as president strikes hard at U.S. hopes for a more vigorous prosecution of the war against the Communist Vietcong. In fact, at midweek, the big question in Washington no longer was whether the war could be won without carrying it to North Vietnam, but whether it could be won at all.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, U.S. policy in South Vietnam cannot help becoming a hot issue in the Presidential campaign. And a political collapse in Saigon could hurt Pres. Johnson at the polls in November.

News leak. The upheaval in Vietnam—the third in less than a year—came as the Administration was shaken by the leak of a confidential study by the Central Intelligence Agency, which suggested that victory was impossible and negotiation probably inevitable in South Vietnam.

In the past, the Administration has insisted that negotiation would be tantamount to handing the Southeast Asian nation over to the Com-

munists, if undertaken before South Vietnam met the military threat posed by Vietcong. Washington has bitterly opposed French Pres. Charles de Gaulle's proposal for negotiations aimed at neutralizing Vietnam.

The CIA report is bound to shake confidence, both in Saigon and here at home, in the steadfastness and realism of U.S. policy. Sen. Barry Goldwater was quick to note the CIA study, and to warn the American people to be prepared for an "announcement in the very near future" of a negotiated peace in Vietnam. He went on to say that neutralization was an open door to Communist infiltration.

Pres. Johnson is hoping, of course, that the lid can be kept on Vietnam until the election is over. But then, whoever wins will be forced to take a new hard look at the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia—barring a

Continued

seemingly miraculous improvement in the situation there.

More rumors. The political situation in Vietnam is confused and explosive. At midweek, Khanh apparently still was in control of the military forces that put him into power last January. But how much political control he would be able to maintain was not clear. He might be relegated to a strictly military role under a new government headed by someone else or, alternatively, forced to share political power with a civilian cabinet representing the Buddhist leadership and political factions that sparked the rioting.

Meanwhile, communal rioting between Buddhists and Catholics was continuing and, despite Khanh's political concessions, rumors of new military coups by supporters of former-President Ngo Dinh Diem filled the air in Saigon. There were even more disturbing reports of an impending all-out offensive by the Vietcong aimed at wresting final victory from the confusion.

Support—or contempt? The political upset in Saigon, ironically, was touched off by Khanh's moves

last week to strengthen his political position by promulgating a new constitution and assuming the presidency under it. He put stern restrictions on personal and political liberties, including strict press censorship, curfews, and the banning of demonstrations.

Buddhist and student leaders, fearing a return to the repressive tactics of the Diem regime, called their followers into the streets. Khanh, unlike Diem, refused to use force against the rioters, fearing to open a second front of civil war. He capitulated to rioters' demands that he scrap the constitution and his presidency. Khanh's worried U.S. advisers hope his moderation will win him support but concede that it is as likely to win him contempt in a country used to strong rule.

Vulnerable position. The U.S. role in the political disaster was not clear at midweek. Officials last week hailed the new constitution and Khanh's assumption of the presidency as likely to stabilize the political situation. This week, however, they were claiming privately that Khanh had acted largely on his own, and were critical of his refusal to consult political leaders before the new constitution was proclaimed.

Khanh's troubles underline how vulnerable the U.S. position in Southeast Asia is to events beyond Washington's control.

The U.S. must back Khanh, as it did his predecessors, if he is to have a chance of winning the war. It must insist that victory can and must be won. But in the process much U.S. prestige is invested in Khanh's fortunes, much more in the outcome of the war.

High U.S. officials this week are at pains to discount the significance of the CIA study, which was released to the press this week after having been leaked to the Chicago Tribune.

But some officials this week, despite these disclaimers, were beginning privately to look again at the possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.



Gen. Khanh refused to use force to put down riots against his regime.

Vietnam Policy And New Doubts

THE DISCLOSURE that the Central Intelligence Agency has given consideration to the possibility of "some kind of negotiated settlement" of the war in South Vietnam and to the possibility of neutralizing the area raises perplexing questions for the American people.

Administration sources have been quick to label the CIA paper one of study but not at all indicative of policy. This is an election year and divulgence of the paper was doubtlessly politically inspired. The instant dismissal of the paper's status must be considered in terms of the vote-seeker. Candidates do not cherish the appeaser's label.

BE THIS AS IT MAY, the paper says to the American people that "there remains serious doubt that the struggle can be won" and warns that "the counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder." The report blames the ineptitude of the Diem regime and of its two successors. The CIA, we believe, speaks here with authority for it is dealing with its own creatures.

The report is a reasonably precise restatement of the views of French President Charles de Gaulle, who says flatly that the United States cannot win the struggle against the jungle shadows. France suffered 172,000 casualties in its own attempt.

De Gaulle's views and this CIA study flatly contradict the repeated assurances of Administration spokesmen that victory is just around the next rice paddy. They also bring into question the entire policy of commitment in a country where massive American aid—reportedly misused and inefficient if not downright corrupt—has resulted in continuing street riots, repeated American casualties and a population not visibly sympathetic with U. S. aims.

Royce Brier

On CIA Gloom About Vietnam

THE SURPRISING THING about the Central Intelligence Agency's estimate that the war in Vietnam probably cannot be won, is that it was drawn up in the first place, and became public in the second place.

There is nothing surprising in the estimate itself, for it is only what close observers without an ax to grind have been saying for the better part of a year.

Unfortunately the Administration, including the President, the Defense Secretary, and some ranking generals, have an ax to grind. There is no chicane in this, as Mr. Johnson's antagonists aver.

It is simply natural that leaders of military operations are going to put the best face possible on it and cannot concede failure until it overtakes them. General Washington didn't and Mr. Lincoln didn't, though this is not to compare old frustrations with Vietnam.



THE VIETNAM WAR MAY NOT be as complicated as it is made to appear by the criss-cross of estimates and pronouncements, official and unofficial, which have been cluttering recent weeks and months.

The United States could win in Vietnam fairly easily, provided there was no Red Chinese intervention. Just put a few divisions of Marines in there and move along, and without nuclear weapons, either. This is what Mr. Johnson's opponents say they would do if they were in his place, but it is to be doubted.

They would not do it if the American people didn't want it, and there is no indication whatever the American people are hankering for the several thousand casualties such a solution would entail.

Moreover, if the Red Chinese elected to throw in hordes of infantry, as they did in Korea, then all bets are off. And it's the kind of all-bets-off situation the American people want least of all.

SO IF THE POLITICIANS of both parties would cease talking nonsense about how to get out of the Vietnam mess, we might get out of it in time, though not with any whopping victory.

President Johnson has to be practical, and he has to have the support of the people. He is still stuck with an optimism uncalled for by the situation, but his optimism is preferable to acting on impulse and wrecking the southeast Asian, if not the world, peace.

You will note that hundreds of students rioted against the Kkanh government Sunday, and took a side-swipe at some American installations. "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us . . ." etc. We are not loved by the Asian masses when we try to save them from a Communist takeover. We are loved (while it lasts) by some leaders whom we cement in power because they are on our side.

It's as coldly pragmatic as that, and ample reason to negotiate ourselves out of a conflict we can't win.

August 26, 1964

Vietnam: Another Wrong Answer

THE SEE-SAW situation in Vietnam, which seemed improving after our fine show of force in the Gulf of Tonkin, teetered down again yesterday.

Strongman Gen. Nguyen Khanh capitulated to a student mob and gave up the presidency, although he says he will remain as premier and chief of the armed forces.

Whether he can do so is in question. Student leaders claim full triumph. They insist that the dictator is out and the third government since the death of Ngo Diem Dinh only nine months ago is on the ash-heap.

Just two days ago the United States reaffirmed its faith in Gen. Khanh and insisted that he is the best man to unify South Vietnam and push the war against the Communist Viet Cong.

In support of the regime the U.S. is building up its forces in Vietnam. Air units rushed there after the Gulf of Tonkin strike are still poised and ground units have been stepped up at least one third.

The determination to stand and if need be push forward seems unshaken.

This collides head-on with a CIA position paper reaching public print Sunday through one of those mysterious "leaks." Prepared last June for the National Security Council, the document challenges our ability to achieve anything more than a "prolonged stalemate" in Southeast Asia. There is "serious doubt that a victory can be won."

The embarrassing Vietnamese question has returned to haunt the administration at the very moment the Democrats are building their Presidential campaign around the boast of sweeping foreign policy victories.

The White House hastily stated the CIA

estimate does not represent official policy. Yet if the estimate is correct — and events of five painful years tend to bolster it — we are in a costly stand-off that could get out of hand at any time.

The need for better answers grows more urgent. Vietnam refuses to remain under wraps until after November 3.

THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, my brief speech today, in opposition to McNamara's war in South Vietnam, is taken from the magazine Business Week for August 29, 1964. Business Week is certainly one of the most stable, moderate periodicals published in this country. So far as I am concerned, their article is my speech, for I associate myself with every word of it. It reads:

NEW PROBLEM FOR UNITED STATES—HOPES FADE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

(As rioters force strong man Khanh out of presidency, it becomes harder for administration to win war against Vietcong. Leaked CIA report hints at negotiations.)

The resignation this week of South Vietnamese strong man, Nguyen Khanh, from his newly acquired job as President strikes hard at U.S. hopes for a more vigorous prosecution of the war against the Communist Vietcong. In fact, at midweek, the big question in Washington no longer was whether the war could be won without carrying it to North Vietnam, but whether it could be won at all.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, U.S. policy in South Vietnam cannot help becoming a hot issue in the presidential campaign. And a political collapse in Saigon could hurt President Johnson at the polls in November.

NEWS LEAK

The upheaval in Vietnam—the third in less than a year—came as the administration was shaken by the leak of a confidential study by the Central Intelligence Agency, which suggested that victory was impossible and negotiation probably inevitable in South Vietnam.

In the past, the administration has insisted that negotiation would be tantamount to handing the southeast Asian nation over to the Communists, if undertaken before South Vietnam met the military threat posed by Vietcong. Washington has bitterly opposed French President Charles de Gaulle's proposal for negotiations aimed at neutralizing Vietnam.

The CIA report is bound to shake confidence, both in Saigon and here at home, in the steadfastness and realism of U.S. policy. Senator BARRY GOLDWATER was quick to note the CIA study, and to warn the American people to be prepared for an announcement in the very near future of a negotiated peace in Vietnam. He went on to say that neutralization was an open door to Communist infiltration.

President Johnson is hoping, of course, that the lid can be kept on Vietnam until the election is over. But then, whoever wins will be forced to take a new hard look at the U.S. involvement in southeast Asia—barring a seemingly miraculous improvement in the situation there.

MORE RUMORS

The political situation in Vietnam is confused and explosive. At midweek, Khanh apparently still was in control of the military forces that put him into power last January. But how much political control he would be able to maintain was not clear. He might be relegated to a strictly military role under a new government headed by someone else or, alternatively, forced to share political power with a civilian cabinet representing the Buddhist leadership and political factions that sparked the rioting.

Meanwhile, communal rioting between Buddhists and Catholics was continuing and, despite Khanh's political concessions, rumors of new military coups by supporters of former President Ngo Dinh Diem filled the air in Saigon. There were even more disturbing reports of an impending all-out offensive by the Vietcong aimed at wresting final victory from the confusion.

SUPPORT—OR CONTEMPT?

The political upset in Saigon, ironically, was touched off by Khanh's moves last week to strengthen his political position by promulgating a new constitution and assuming the Presidency under it. He put stern restrictions on personal and political liberties, including strict press censorship, curfews, and the banning of demonstrations.

Buddhist and student leaders, fearing a return to the repressive tactics of the Diem regime, called their followers into the streets. Khanh, unlike Diem, refused to use force against the rioters, fearing to open a second front of civil war. He capitulated to rioters' demands that he scrap the constitution and his Presidency. Khanh's worried U.S. advisers hope his moderation will win him support but concede that it is as likely to win him contempt in a country used to strong rule.

VULNERABLE POSITION

The U.S. role in the political disaster was not clear at midweek. Officials last week hailed the new constitution and Khanh's assumption of the Presidency as likely to stabilize the political situation. This week, however, they were claiming privately that Khanh had acted largely on his own, and were critical of his refusal to consult political leaders before the new constitution was proclaimed.

Khanh's troubles underline how vulnerable the U.S. position in southeast Asia is to events beyond Washington's control.

The United States must back Khanh, as it did his predecessors, if he is to have a chance of winning the war. It must insist that victory can and must be won. But in the process much U.S. prestige is invested in Khanh's fortunes, much more in the outcome of the war.

High U.S. officials this week are at pains to discount the significance of the CIA study, which was released to the press this week

after having been leaked to the Chicago Tribune.

But some officials this week, despite these disclaimers, were beginning privately to look again at the possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

Mr. President, this article in Business Week clearly summarizes the situation in South Vietnam. The American people are beginning to recognize more and more that our position in South Vietnam is untenable morally, militarily, and legally. More and more the American people are beginning to appreciate the fact that we owe it to the history of our country and we owe it to the boys who will be killed unjustifiably in the months ahead in the uncalled for American participation in the war in South Vietnam, to get this issue back within the framework of international law, as the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] and the Senator from Oregon have pleaded for at least 6 months on the floor of the Senate.

The ugly reality is that the United States, although it uses other semantic terms, is following a policy of colonialism in South Vietnam. We have set up a puppet protectorate in South Vietnam. We are seeking to operate it as colonial powers operated colonies in generations gone by. No white nation will ever be able to maintain a colony in the yellow part of the world. Let us face the issue.

Therefore, I close tonight by pleading again that the United States stop its unilateral military action in southeast Asia; that we stop supporting a military dictatorship; that we stop joining that military dictatorship in stamping out freedom in South Vietnam; and that we lay the whole issue before the United Nations or before a 14-nation conference, as recommended by President de Gaulle, for the application of international law for its settlement.

UTICA, N. Y.
OBSERVER-DISPATCH

e. 47,140
S. 60,212

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 25 1964

War Beyond Hope?

Sunday's O-D carried a report by a Central Intelligence Agency official that we cannot win the war in Viet Nam.

This is not the view of the United States government, as represented by President and State Department. But it's a view hinted at in the opinion of several of our high officials, including Henry Cabot Lodge, that the winning is not in sight. Even Secretary of Defense McNamara, although on record in various opinions at various times on the subject, has said the victory will take time.

How much time? That's what the American people want to know. Nobody knows, obviously, but the reports from independent sources are not encouraging.

Ten days ago our Sunday editorial column recalled the view of the New York Times' David Halberstam, expressed in April, that there was little enough evidence on the spot out there to back up official optimism in Washington.

And the CIA man's report published last Sunday was followed by dispatches of student rioting in Saigon. These riots of youngsters are a sign of coming upheaval in that area of the world. Korea's Syngman Rhee fell before agitated student pressure. Students played a big part in the fall of the Diem regime in Saigon.

South Viet Nam has a new boss, now using practically dictatorial powers. But Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh has been avoiding tough repressive measures. This is no doubt on the advice of U. S. diplomats, who hope to see the "dust settle" and feel that former President Diem's opposition to the Buddhists and students hastened his fall.

But Khanh is sitting on a powder keg, and our prestige, what's left of it, in Asia is right beside him.

Col. Ray Cromley's reports on this page last week described the lack of morale in the countryside. The people outside the cities find that the government troops, even with U. S. aid, are not providing protection against Red Viet Cong infiltrators and raiders. The people, therefore, are likely to help the Reds in order to be safe, and listen to the Communists promises and propaganda which they lack the education and information to diagnose it for the lies involved.

The news from Saigon is almost constantly bad. Have we here another Korea, where we finally accepted virtual defeat in a stalemate that still exists? South Viet Nam is far away but it may yet be one of the major factors in how the American people vote in November. There's a war on there, and we are not winning it.

WATERBURY, CONN.
REPUBLICAN

m. 24,059
S. 50,455

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

AUG 26 1964

Truth About Viet Nam

Getting used to unpleasant facts.

The war is going badly in South Viet Nam, and it may get worse. But before any action is taken to expand it, the dimensions of the debate on Southeast Asia must be increased.

An officer of the Central Intelligence Agency has done just that with a paper prepared for the National Intelligence Estimates Board which voices serious doubt that the anti-guerrilla war can be won, and predicts a negotiated settlement will be the eventual outcome.

This is all very probable, but not very proper in the light of American commitments and policies in Saigon. There will be some who will charge the CIA is trying to undermine U. S. efforts in South Viet Nam, and others who will argue that fresh

intelligence gives the U. S. Government reason to pull out altogether.

We hope it will stimulate a responsible dialog on the Vietnamese situation. President Johnson, because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, has been given advance congressional approval of any necessary actions in Southeast Asia. But no one has made debate on the ultimate American involvement and resolution there a forbidden subject.

We may find, for example, that French President Charles de Gaulle's solution, though not in the best interest of the United States, may be the only one available. And that while neutralization may not be neat, it may very well be necessary. If we don't take a hard look at Viet Nam we may find that others will make our decision for us.

PEEKSKILL, N. Y.
STAR

e. 10,905

Front	Edi	Other
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Date: AUG 26 1964

Travail In South Vietnam

IT IS MUCH too early to discern what effect the mob-forced resignation of President Nguyen Khanh will have on the prosecution of the South Vietnam war effort or the course of government in that far-off land to which United States prestige is so intimately connected.

Whatever the immediate result, one can be sure that the new political turmoil raises grave questions in the minds of Americans, who already have sacrificed 182 of their sons in conflict in support of that disturbed nation.

THE IMPRESSION increasingly grows that we are in a situation from which we cannot hope to escape unsullied, if we can escape at all.

In the name of democracy, we have been pouring out men and money to keep South Vietnam from being overrun by Communists.

Yet, we're not doing a very good job of it. Disturbing reports tell of repeated gains by the Red Viet Cong guerrillas in jungle battles, arrogant invasions of hamlets and cities by terrorists, and continued demonstration of the lack of rapport between government and the people.

Add to all this the disclosure of a C.I.A. "study paper," which supports a negoti-

ated settlement looking toward a neutralized South Vietnam, and we become even more perplexed.

ARE WE INDULGING in defensive war only to demean ourselves? Have we accepted the proposition that we must not win any brushfire conflict in Asia? Do we intend to combat aggression with mere show of force? What really is going on over there?

If we've been committed to some sinister set of fighting rules under which the South Vietnamese won't fight and we can't, under which the populace can be whipped into a frenzy and governmental regimes can be brought down any time provocateurs are set loose, under which our courage goes unquestioned but our might and will are ridiculed—then it seems time we started drawing up a new set of rules that will make sense to the American people.

HIGH POINT, N.C.
ENTERPRISE

e. 26,612
S. 26,645

Front Edit Other
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Date: AUG 24 1964

Urgency In Viet Nam

Word that "some kind of negotiated settlement" of hostilities in South Viet Nam is in the works, constitutes the most hopeful news in months from that troubled part of the world.

The settlement, which while not yet official, would be based upon effective neutralization of the area.

For some while it has been distressfully apparent that the U. S. might again be on wrong course there. Events and forces have maneuvered President Johnson into relation with the Khanh regime not unlike that in which President Kennedy found himself in backing the Diem regime.

Clearly, military intervention can't succeed where there is not some fair degree of political stability. And the Khanh regime appears to be crumbling just as the Diem regime did. Indeed, earlier the French found much the same situation and gave it all up as a bad deal.

We now find ourselves in the unhappy position of backing another dictatorship which antagonizes the South Vietnamese people to the extent they will not fight Communists for a government they resent.

This business of one regime's using American resources to suppress its

own people during a war those same people are asked to fight is as unworthy as it is impractical. Mr. Kennedy had the courage to quit underwriting terror of the Diem regime. But what we got, it now appears, is a second round of the same thing by another crowd. As the Khanh regime retreats into the same faults of its predecessor, we find ourselves mirroring in a near hopeless jungle which cries for stabilization more than victory for any group or side.

The C.I.A. proposal is based in realization that decay is undermining an already troubled situation. For five years guerrilla war has gone on with no end in sight. Political mistakes, first of the Diem regime and more lately of Khanh's, inhibit effective prosecution of a war which really is more a political contest than a military operation.

As it becomes clearer that victory cannot be won and that a stalemate, supported by U. S. military power on the one hand and Communist purpose on the other, has resulted, then stabilization through neutralization holds the obvious answer to an impossible situation in which the President has both responsibility and power to do something constructive.

**BOISE, IDAHO
STATESMAN**

m. 37,561
S. 46,420

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 24 1964

Nothing to Boast About

The Johnson administration is in trouble when it waves its accomplishments in foreign relations before the American public. Actually, it has nothing to boast of in international affairs.

And the average man who has watched his country become mired down in foreign conflicts may assess bluntly the administration's involvements as nothing but failures.

The nuclear strength of which Defense Secretary McNamara so confidently speaks is not a Johnson attainment, but goes back to past administrations which set the pattern by which this nation could be supreme.

Though it may recite statistics, the Johnson administration has relied upon push button armaments — many untested — and placed our manned bombers, our foot soldiers way down the line from our missile stockpile. What is there to boast about in improving the fire power of the infantryman? Yet he is the one called forth to battle in Viet Nam, or any other place where a "brush fire" needs squelching. Then when he arrives, instead of striving for victory his mission is to reach a stalemate.

* * *

A Central Intelligence Agency officer has "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam, according to the Associated Press. He suggests that the eventual outcome might be a negotiated settlement. With an election campaign getting into gear, there was nothing for the Johnson administration to do but disagree with this statement.

A negotiated settlement means a move "to save face." If the CIA report is correct, then the Johnson administration should so tell the American people. If we have erred in lining up new leadership in South Viet Nam and the nation's government is more immersed in religious strife than it is in combating Red Viet Cong, the nation should be told.

* * *

But politics comes first with President Johnson. Nothing is to ruin his career at this late stage of the game. No reported collapse of American effort in South Viet Nam is to be publicly aired.

The Democratic party platform brags of its record in national defense, and harks back to 1960 when the convention in Los Angeles proposed to: "Recast our military capacity in order to provide forces and weapons of a diversity, balance and mobility sufficient in quantity and quality to deter both limited and general aggression."

Then the administration's achievements are listed in order of the increase in nuclear warheads, the reduction in plutonium production, and increases in the "number" of Army divisions, Marine Corps regulars, special forces and ship construction. But such a recital is a mockery to many observers, when the United States has trouble knowing how to do the job.

* * *

The Berlin Wall still stands in the shadow of our might. The Bay of Pigs fiasco showed our weakness in spite of developing 208 major new research and development projects including 77 weapons programs with costs exceeding \$10 million each.

Indeed, old B-26 World War II bombers were the mainstay of the U. S. Air Force in tactical missions in South Viet Nam, and we invaded The Congo just the other day in a collection of old troop carrier planes carrying some airborne troops "to negotiate settlement there," another major involvement in which Americans may die.

* * *

The platform from Atlantic City hails the administration's feat of training over

Continued

100,000 officers in counter-insurgency skills necessary to fight guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare and the increase in our Special Forces trained to deal with counter insurgency by 800 per cent. But apparently this is so much grapeshot when put to use against the Berlin Wall, Castro or the Viet Cong.

The Johnson administration continues to boast: "In reconstructing the nation's defense establishment, the administration has insisted that the services be guided by these three precepts: (1) Buy only what we need. (2) Buy only at the lowest sound price. (3) Reduce operating costs through standardization, consolidation and termination of unnecessary operations. This might have been rewritten to include: "Buy only what we need to keep a healthy defense manufacturing climate in areas where the vote is the heaviest; buy only at the lowest sound price, being careful to award the TFX contract to Lyndon's home state where the vote is heavy; reduce operating costs by clearing out a fighter squadron in the lightly-populated Spokane area and move it to the more populated Seattle-Tacoma area with the fighters based in a heavier-vote area."

These are "political" achievements of the Johnson administration.

* * *

After this plank was nailed down, the party has the unmitigated gall to echo its President's words: "We have successfully met the challenges of Berlin and Cuba, and attacks upon our naval forces on the high seas, thus decreasing the prospect of further such challenges and brightening the outlook for peace."

It is understood that all the American voters may not have the keen intellect of the computer brains found in our Defense establishment but if the citizens of the United States are fooled by such unbridled oratorical malarkey, our once proud democracy is becoming soft and rather useless to impede the Red tide abroad or at home. Politicians are becoming more mealy mouthed double-talkers than ever.

Firm Vietnam Decision Overdue

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 1, 1964

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the American people generally recognize the difficulties under which our Government, as the leading world power and main target of Communist hostility, must operate in the area of international relations. Our people have accepted their burden of heavy taxation, of disappointment and frustration over military reverses, and also tragic announcements of casualties with admirable fortitude. They ask only that their sacrifices serve a worthwhile purpose; point toward an attainable goal. But they do object to pouring tax dollars, and American lives, into a bottomless quicksand, in Asia, in Africa, or anywhere else. Evidence of dissatisfaction with a policy that accepts a long-drawn-out and costly stalemate is contained in an editorial published in the State Journal, of Lansing, Mich., August 25, 1964.

By unanimous consent, and under leave to extend my remarks, I would like to include this temperate, reasoned statement of what I believe is the present attitude of most Americans toward our operations and policies in Vietnam:

**FIRM VIETNAM DECISION BY UNITED STATES IS
LONG OVERDUE**

A Central Intelligence Agency officer's "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam probably is shared by many other Americans in spite of the optimistic views expressed from time to time by various spokesmen for the Johnson administration.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against the Communist guerrillas in the southeast Asian country is in sight was voiced by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias said at that time that the Communist Vietcong had stepped up their offen-

sive while the counter guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon Government.

In other words, the trend in the part of the world situation in South Vietnam was unfavorable, in Matthias' view, as of last June. There are no indications it is any better now.

Stating that "the guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its 5th year and no end appears in sight," Matthias continued:

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

The CIA official said there is a chance that future development "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization," an idea that has been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle but coolly received by the U.S. administration.

Matthias also said continued large-scale U.S. support of the antiguerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate."

Neither alternative is palatable for the administration, some of whose spokesmen, following repeated but apparently futile visits to the strife-torn country, concede that the struggle will be long and hard but hold out hope for eventual victory.

The CIA officer's 50-page assessment of the situation was made available by administration sources when they learned it would be published in a Chicago newspaper.

This raises the question of whether it would ever have been made known to the American people upon the initiative of an administration which does not share, publicly at least, the pessimistic views expressed by Matthias.

One thing is clear. The unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam confronts the administration with the responsibility of deciding without more delay upon a policy designed to bring the war to a successful conclusion or to accept a policy of neutralization, unattractive as the latter alternative may be.

As we see it, the administration should make a determined effort to avoid a prolonged stalemate in which Americans would continue to die and more millions of dollars in U.S. resources would be expended.

RR

Theory of Soviet Amiability Revived in Secret CIA Report

Nikita Threats Are Dismissed as 'Oratory'

BY WILLARD EDWARDS
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

Washington, Aug. 22—United States' foreign policy planners are studying a top level intelligence report depicting Russia as an increasingly amiable power open to peaceful settlement of international disputes.

This Russia - is - mellowing theory went into temporary eclipse after the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. Evidence it again is thriving in the highest circles of the Johnson administration has been obtained by THE TRIBUNE.

A 47-page report dated Feb. 19, 1964, and marked "secret" has been circulated in the White House, national security council, and the state and defense departments.

Prepared by C. I. A.

Based on reports gathered by the world wide espionage network of the central intelligence agency, it was prepared and endorsed by the board of national estimates of that agency.

It argues that the Soviet Union, under the impact of economic stress and difficulties with Red China, is losing its hostility to the west and is seeking a new kind of relationship with the United States.

This comforting theme brushes off the bellicose threats of Nikita Khrushchev and the international campaign organization.

Khrushchev, the report asserts, has made a decision to negotiate better relations with the United States. The source of this information is not disclosed.

Red Activity Brushed Aside
Despite the establishment of a soviet outpost in Cuba and

communist subversion and terrorism in Africa, the far east and South America, the report expresses the belief that Russia will diminish "the vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the communist world" in the future.

A dark picture was drawn of the situation in Viet Nam, where "there remains serious doubt that victory can be won" and a "prolonged stalemate" is the most to be anticipated. The report says "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization" is the only solution.

If the communist world has its troubles, they are matched by similar developments in the west, the paper asserts. Europe views the United States as "overdramatizing" its problems in Latin America and the far east. American influence in Europe is waning.

The report has a covering memorandum signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the board of national estimates. He noted that the contents, entitled "Trends in the World Situation," had been "twice revised and supplemented after board discussion."

Johnson Heads Board
The board of estimates of the CIA submits its findings to the United States intelligence

board, which operates within the national security council structure. The council is headed by President Johnson, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara as its leading members.

The theme that Russia is evolving into a potential ally, having abandoned its goal of world conquest, was advanced more than two years ago in a secret strategy guide compiled by Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the state department's policy planning board.

Disclosure Stirs Furor

Disclosure of the Rostow report by this newspaper in June, 1962, caused a storm in Congress and the questioning of Rostow in secret session. He invoked executive privilege to avoid comment on a classified document. The state department declared the newspaper report had been "garbled" and "distorted."

Four months later, the late President Kennedy and Khrushchev were confronting each other in a crisis aroused by the discovery of soviet missiles in Cuba. Talk about Russia's peaceful intentions subsided for a time but in June, 1963, Kennedy again was calling for a change of attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The new report under study by the policy-planners argues that the stand taken by Kennedy in the Cuban affair disillusioned soviet leaders about the usefulness of military power in international disputes. It suggested the possession of military power no longer was

a predominant factor in foreign policy.

Meets Stiff Opposition

This contention, implying advocacy of a negative defense policy intended to maintain the status quo while Russia evolves into a peace-loving state, has met with spirited opposition in some government circles. The joint chiefs of staff, at the time of the nuclear test ban hearings, prepared a position paper which stated flatly that "militant Communism remains dedicated to the destruction of our society."

Summarizing its survey of "world trends," the CIA document remarks:

"It is possible in the present context of soviet policy—particularly to the extent that this policy derives from the U. S. S. R.'s appreciation of the military situation and from its own difficulties at home and within the communist world — that some movement toward the settlement of some international issues will occur."

The obstacles to a "general detente" [widespread relaxation of tensions] remained great, the paper conceded, because of such problems as Berlin and "the new tensions and problems which will arise from the disorderly character of so much of the world."

Cites Long-Run Changes

Over the "longer run," the paper continued, "we continue to believe that the gradual changes taking place in the U. S. S. R. will diminish its hostility to the west and the vigor of its revolutionary effort

outside the communist world.

"This process of change may even halted, but it is probably irreversible..."

Altho the United States possesses greater striking power than Russia and could wreak much greater damage on the foe than could the latter to the United States, the size, armament, and operational capabilities of opposing military forces no longer are crucial questions, the paper argued.

"... one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of forces will deter and that another will not. Deterrence is a mental state and it depends to a preponderant degree not upon a precise level of forces but upon a variety of other factors such as how the party to be deterred estimates the military forces arrayed against him..."

The problems within the communist world are not only obvious but "spectacular," the paper asserted. It noted the "open quarrel" between Red China and Russia, the economic failure in China, and the Russian need to buy wheat.

But "disunity, indiscipline, and decline in ideology" in the communist world have been matched, the paper declared, by similar developments in the west. The Atlantic alliance has suffered and American influence in Europe has been reduced. In disputes between the communist world and the United States, European nations "do not want the United States to be defeated or humbled outside Europe, but neither do they wish the United States to create... issues of a critical character outside Europe."

"They are inclined," the paper stated, "to believe that the United States makes too much of Latin American, African, and far eastern problems, that it

overdramatizes them and makes them more significant than they really are, and that steps should be taken to minimize, to quiet, or to neutralize them."

The paper was pessimistic about the future of new states in Africa. Many more eruptions of violence were predicted. "By and large, the drift seems to be toward political and social chaos."

The document was almost despairing in its consideration of the problem in Viet Nam:

"The guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is entering its fifth year and no end appears in sight..."

There is also a chance for some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

VIET VICTORY DOUBT VOICED

GIA Official Suggests
Negotiation With Reds

Viet students set deadline for
reform Page 2

Washington, Aug. 22 (AP)—A CIA officer has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam and has suggested the eventual outcome might be a negotiated settlement.

Administration sources said today this is not the United States Government view.

"Prolonged Stalemate"

The conclusion that no military end to the war against Red guerrillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of national estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong have stepped up their offensive and the counter-guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon Government.

Continued large-scale United States support of the anti-guerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," the CIA officer said.

Matthias said there is also a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization." French President Charles de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area, an idea received coolly by the United States Government.

Administration sources made the 50-page document available after hearing it would be published in the Chicago Tribune.

A "cover sheet" to Matthias's paper, signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the national estimates board, stated that the document was circulated "for information." The paper "has general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it," Kent said.

Matthias wrote:

"The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources, but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever.

"More Political Than Military"

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction. The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a pro-

longed stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Expressing Own Views

In releasing the paper, Administration sources emphasized these views:

1. Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the United States Government or of any agency within the Government. Members of the national intelligence estimates board, a twelve-man CIA committee, and others have written numerous papers which are valuable for circulating ideas but do not represent policy.

2. Matthias's memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials but was never given to the policy-setting National Security Council. It was submitted for publication to a magazine, which turned it down.

U.S. Fully Committed

3. The anti-guerrilla campaign in South Vietnam may be long and arduous, but the United States is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there, and believes this will be done.

4. The United States government also sees no grounds for negotiation with the Reds over South Vietnam at this time. A negotiated settlement has already been reached at the Geneva conferences on Indo-China and it is up to the Geneva accords by their guerrilla aggression.

AUG 23 1964

CIA Viet Paper Is Called 'One Man's Opinion'

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI).—High administration officials said today that a central intelligence Agency document declaring that victory over the Communist in South Viet Nam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U.S. policy.

The 45-page paper, prepared by Williard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates attempts to assess development in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

STIRS OFFICIALS

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

NEVER CONSIDERED

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to, or considered by, President Johnson's National Security Council nor the top level U.S. intelligence estimate board.

Official sources disclosed existence of the document when they learned it had been offered for publication as a major outline of American policy. They asserted that this was not true and that the ideas were, as one official put it, "only one man's opinion."

Aside from the Viet Nam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese — Russian ideological

C.I.A. Aide Suggests Saigon 'Settlement'

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—An official of the Central Intelligence Agency has suggested the possibility of "some kind of negotiated settlement" of the hostilities in South Vietnam.

According to the proposal, which was made public but not endorsed by Administration sources, the negotiated settlement would be based upon neutralization of the area.

Willard Matthias, a member of the agency's Board of National Estimates, one of the highest units in the body, was the author of the suggestion in a 50-page working paper dated June 8.

Administration officials emphasized that it did not reflect official United States policy. It was apparently made available because a copy was said to have been obtained by The Chicago Tribune, which indicated it planned to print excerpts.

Mr. Matthias observed in his paper that there was "serious doubt that victory can be won." He indicated that, at best, "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved.

His paper was entitled "Trends in the World Situation."

When it was made available to the press it had a cover sheet, signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, stating that the papers had "general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it."

A colleague of Mr. Matthias described the paper as very thoughtful and said it had been distributed "because it was thought-provoking."

He said the best way to describe it was as a "think piece," typical of many distributed throughout the agencies of Gov-

Qualified sources said, however, that while Mr. Matthias's views on negotiating a settlement did not reflect the official United States position, they were widely held in the Government and the subject of recurrent official discussions.

'Guarantees' Urged

An opinion that is often put forward in these discussions holds that negotiation simply to bring to an end to hostilities would be wrong without "self-enforcing" guarantees that the South Vietnamese would be left in peace.

At the same time, it is held that negotiation could be contemplated by both Washington and Saigon after military stabilization had been brought about by impressive victories against the Communist Vietcong.

On this point, however, Mr. Matthias's paper was gloomy. He wrote:

"The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Vietcong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever.

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and

gile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

"There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

The Administration has consistently turned away proposals for neutralization as an outcome of the hostilities in South Vietnam. President de Gaulle of France, in his proposals for such a settlement, has been rebuffed repeatedly at the White House and the State Department.

However, from time to time members of Congress have displayed a positive interest in the neutralization proposals. The Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, urged the Administration last February to encourage rather than spurn the French efforts to negotiate with Communist China for a settlement based on neutralization.

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Intelligence on Vietnam

The publication of a Vietnam evaluation made inside of the nation's most responsible intelligence bodies adds an important new element to appraisal of the war in Southeast Asia. The evaluation is that there is "serious doubt that victory can be won" and that, at best, "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved. The study looks to the possibility of "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

True, the text of this document was released, after a leak, as a means of denying that it represents Administration policy. But the study was prepared in June by a member of the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other board members read and approved it in general terms. And, as Times correspondent Jack Raymond reported from Washington yesterday, qualified officials now confirm what has been long suspected—it reflects a view "widely held in the Government and the subject of recurrent official discussion."

This confirmation should be followed by a full, frank, realistic report on the facts which led to this C.I.A. assessment, so that the country can judge for itself whether the Administration is right to reject it. Two arguments have been made by Washington in the past in spurning similar proposals. One is that a negotiated peace would open the way to a Communist takeover unless there were enforceable guarantees of South Vietnam's independence. The other is that impressive military victories are needed first to enable the anti-Communist forces

to negotiate from strength.

These arguments are unconvincing. The guarantee needed to enforce a settlement must be an integral part of any agreement. But few are likely to be offered by the Communists while the official American position is that any conference is unthinkable. As for negotiating from strength, Tonkin Gulf adequately demonstrated the naval and air supremacy of the United States in Southeast Asia. The one-third increase in American military personnel now under way gives evidence of American determination on the ground as well. This increased military aid should be linked with a parallel diplomatic effort to explore an accommodation that protects South Vietnam's independence, although it is probably unrealistic to expect that any effort along this line will be made until after the American Presidential elections are over.

Undoubtedly, it is as clear to the Vietcong as it is to the C.I.A. that, after five years of guerrilla war, "no end appears in sight." The Communists know that their terrorist attacks can maintain an atmosphere of insecurity. But they can have few illusions that they, any more than Saigon, can achieve military victory. Both sides are confronted equally with the unattractive prospects of a prolonged stalemate. The time has come to find out whether Hanoi and Peking, on one side, and Saigon and Washington, on the other, can end this wasting confrontation by establishing a neutral Vietnam with enforceable devices for keeping both North and South independent.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

AUGUST 23, 1964

64

NEW YORK

Herald Tribune

FOUNDED BY HORACE GREELEY, APRIL 10, 1841

The Herald Tribune makes available a broad cross section of informed and responsible opinion through the views and observations of our columnists. Our own opinions are expressed in these editorials.

22 Monday, August 24, 1964

Leaky CIA

Secrecy obviously is an essential condition for conducting any intelligence activity. Yet the Central Intelligence Agency is having difficulty in meeting it.

The CIA's function is not only to gather but also to evaluate information. The second aspect can be even more important than the first. Gathering information may tell us something about the enemy's intentions. Our evaluation of it could tell the enemy something about our own. Hence it should be kept all the more secret.

The Johnson administration denies that the CIA paper on Viet Nam which fell into the hands of a Chicago paper (and therefore available to the enemy upon publication) represents either government or CIA policy. We hope not because its extremely pessimistic evaluation, repeating President

de Gaulle's proposal of "neutralization," has been rejected by Washington as a move toward surrendering the region to the Communists.

The CIA paper, whether the work of only one man, as Secretary Rusk maintains, or of more than one is nevertheless a CIA paper. It may have been just another "think piece," such as most government agencies and newspapers ask their staffs to write. But CIA thinking, individual or collective, is supposed to be secret because it is related to what is supposed to be intelligence at the highest level.

Generalizing a leak to one paper by making it available to all may help defuse domestic political repercussions to a potentially damaging evaluation. But it does not help restore confidence in the CIA either at home or abroad.

AUGUST 23, 1964

CIA Official: 'Neutralize' S. Viet Nam

More on Viet Nam, Page 15-A

Herald Tribune Wire

WASHINGTON—A ranking Central Intelligence Agency official believes there is "serious doubt" the Communist rebellion in South Viet Nam can be quelled and that a "prolonged stalemate" might be all the West can hope for.

This conclusion, reached in a scholarly paper called "Trends in the World Situation," promises to set off a political explosion because of Sen. Barry Goldwater's determination to make the Vietnamese war a major campaign issue. The Republican presidential candidate accuses the administration of being timid in dealing with Communists.

ALTHOUGH THE CIA was prepared to allow publication of the entire paper in a scholarly journal, the administration became concerned when it learned that one newspaper—the Chicago Tribune—had acquired a copy. The newspaper was understood to be planning a story on the document today.

The State Department attempted to reduce the impact of the story by making the paper available to a small group of reporters Friday night. At the same time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reportedly said that the document did not represent the administration's viewpoint.

RUSK WAS SAID to have emphasized that the paper was the work of one man only—the author of it, Willard Matthias—and that it had no official status. Other sources said the paper was not an official appraisal by the CIA's Board of National Estimates, even though Matthias is a member of that important body and even though other board members saw the report and approved it in general terms.

The board consists of about 12 members and although it operates as part of CIA, it receives "input"—government jargon for a variety of contributions—from all intelligence units in the government. The board's duty is to appraise masses of intelligence reports and render its opinions as to

what it all means. The board is sometimes described as a "think factory."

THE 45-PAGE PAPER, dated June 9, 1964, touched on virtually every aspect of the cold war. Its controversial section on South Viet Nam consisted of just these few lines:

"The Guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely on their own resources but under direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever. The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large scale United States support continues, and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene would lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based on neutralization."

WHILE SOME AMERICAN officials have made remarks to this effect privately in the last few months—and while some unofficial observers have stated similar conclusions in print—the fact that these views are being expressed by a senior CIA official casts them in a different light.

The paper will probably have international, as well as domestic, political repercussions.

Officially, Washington has dismissed any talk of "neutralization" of South Viet Nam as tantamount to a victory for the Communists because no one seriously believes that North Viet Nam could be detached from the Communist bloc. President De Gaulle of France has proposed neutralization—much to Washington's displeasure—after he, too, concluded that the changes of Vietnam would be a disaster for the world.

AUGUST 23, 1964

A View Within CIA: Can't Win in Viet

By Laurence Barrett
Of The Herald Tribune Staff

WASHINGTON.

A ranking Central Intelligence Agency official believes there is "serious doubt" that the Communist rebellion in South Viet Nam can be quelled and says a "prolonged stalemate" might be all the West can hope for.

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CIA Official Is Doubtful Of Victory in Viet Nam

By the Associated Press

A Central Intelligence Agency officer has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam and has suggested the eventual outcome might be a negotiated settlement. Administration sources said yesterday this is not the United States Government view.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against Red

guerrillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Mr. Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong have stepped up their offensive and the counter-guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

Sees Long Stalemate

Continued large-scale United States support of the anti-guerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Viet Nam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," the CIA officer said.

Mr. Matthias said there also is a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization." French President Charles de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area, an idea coolly received by the United States Government.

Administration sources made the 50-page document available after learning it would be published in the Chicago Tribune.

A cover sheet to Mr. Matthias' paper, signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the National Estimates Board, stated that the document was circulated "for information." The paper "has general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it," Mr. Kent said.

Viet Cong Active

Mr. Matthias wrote that "the guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight."

"The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever," he said.

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction."

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

Situation Is Fragile

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained."

"There also is a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Administration sources emphasized these views.

Mr. Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the United States Government or of any agency within the United States Government. Members of the National Intelligence Estimates Board, a 12-man CIA committee, and others have written numerous papers which are valuable for circulating ideas but do not represent policy.

Mr. Matthias' memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials but was never given to the policy-setting National Security Council. It was submitted for publication to a magazine, which turned it down.

The anti-guerrilla campaign in South Viet Nam may be long and arduous, but the United States Government is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there, and believe this will be done.

The United States Government sees no grounds for negotiation with the Reds over South Viet Nam at this time. A negotiated settlement already has been reached at the Geneva conferences on Indo-China and it is up to the Communists to quit their guerrilla aggression.

Release of CIA Report Has Political Overtones

By Murrey Marder
Staff Reporter

The State Department released an unpublished Central Intelligence Agency memorandum on world trends yesterday in a move that had more implications of politics than foreign policy.

Release of the document was precipitated by a story on the same report written for publication today by reporter Willard Edwards of the Chicago Tribune News Service. The Chicago Tribune story suggested that the document was an official internal analysis of secret Administration policy. The State Department acted to counter that implication.

What gave particular significance to the sequence of disclosures is that they came on the eve of the opening of the Democratic National Convention and centered on two politically sensitive themes: (1) a forecast in the report that Soviet "hostility toward the West" is likely to diminish and (2) an expression of strong doubt that "victory can be won" against Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam.

Memorandum Shown

State Department officials showed newsmen a 45-page memorandum, entitled "Trends in the World Situation," written

by Willard Matthias of the Board of National Estimates of the CIA.

Officials said the Matthias document is "a think piece" that does not represent official policy, and dozens of similar documents circulate constantly. They said it was never considered or approved by either the United States Intelligence Board, or by the National Security Council that is headed by President Johnson, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara among its members. Officials said the Matthias memorandum circulated only at lower levels in the Government.

Two years ago, a similar dispute broke out over a Chicago Tribune account of a 160-page survey of foreign policy by Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council.

Dirksen Is Critical

Senate Republican Leader Everett M. Dirksen and Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) assailed what they charged was Rostow's theme that the Soviet Union is "mellowing." The dispute intensified GOP charges that the Kennedy Administration was following a "no-win" policy.

Rostow emerged from a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the Democrats singing his praises for "toughness

on Communism, and Dirksen declaring that the incident was only "round number one" of a long fight. That document was never made public.

The Chicago Tribune account said the current document depicts the Soviet Union "as an increasingly amiable power open to peaceful settlement of international disputes."

That article described the document as a 47-page report, dated Feb. 19, 1964, marked "secret," and circulated in the White House, National Security Council, State and Defense Department. It said a covering memorandum signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates of the CIA, said the document received "general Board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point of it" and it was being "circulated for information."

Difference in Dates

The State Department made public a document with the same identification and quotations, although it is dated June 9, 1964, and is not marked "secret" but carries the marking, "official use only." That is the lowest security classification, which some agencies, including the State Department, have eliminated because of its marginal inhibitions.

Much of the Matthias report reflects the Administration's well known and publicly stated major foreign policy theme: That the Cuban crisis of 1962, and the open Sino-Soviet conflict, have altered world power relations, with the United States and the Soviet Union tacitly acknowledging that a nuclear balance of terror exists in the world, encouraging them to search for limited areas of East-West agreement, while their basic differences are still constant. The 1964 Republican platform, and Sen. Goldwater, the GOP nominee for President, reject much of that evaluation.

But the most controversial section concerns South Viet-Nam. The Matthias review states:

"The guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the South, dependent largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the North, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever . . ."

'Political Contest'

It describes the conflict as "more of a political contest

Continued

than a military operation" and states that the heavily American-supported counter-guerrilla effort, "continues to flounder..."

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet-Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged

stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

State Department officials emphasized that those views on Viet-Nam, including talk of "neutralizing" it, are contrary to U.S. policy.

In East-West relations, the Matthias review finds that the late President Kennedy's firmness in the Cuban missile crisis "encouraged the Soviets to seek a new kind of relationship with the U.S. and made clear the limits of American patience and hope."

Obstacles Noted

While it is likely that "some movement toward the settle-

ment of some international issues will occur," the "obstacles to a general detente are very great," the report states. The obstacles, it says, will be the Soviets' "basically hostile attitude toward the West" and "new tensions and problems" that will arise in a "disorderly world" where neither great nuclear power can effectively employ that power to exert its will.

The "chances are good," however, the report finds, that "gradual changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. will diminish its hostility to the West and the vigor of its revolutionary spirit outside the Communist world." The report concludes that "for the next several years at least the world may be replete with strife and disorder but not on the verge of nuclear disaster."

**HARTFORD, CONN.
COURANT****m. 124,441
S. 168,428****Front Edit Other
Page Page Page****AUG 28 1964****Notes:
Adopt a Win Policy
In South Vietnam****To the Editor of The Courant:**

I was alarmed to read recently that a leading C.I.A. official had written a report advocating neutralization of Vietnam. This plan which would of course necessitate withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam, reportedly had "general approval" of the C.I.A.'s Board of National Estimates.

Let me be quick to remind any compromisers of the "peaceful" solution the U.S. State Department agreed to in Laos. The United States and Soviet diplomats agreed to the establishment of a coalition government, a government which named 13 Communists to the 15 member cabinet, a government which ousted anti-Communist president Boua Oum, a government which allowed 10,000 Communist soldiers to remain in Laos thus violating Khrushchev's pledge.

It is about time the United States reversed this trend and adopted a win policy in Vietnam. The Soviet have proven time and time again that peaceful coexistence with the Communists is impossible. We are experiencing a time when America must strengthen its stand in South Vietnam and prove to its people that we will not sit back and allow them to become slaves of the Communists.

Any other program would be moral prostitution and a disheartening disgrace to the nearly 200 families of American soldiers who have given their lives for the defense of freedom.

Bruce W. Friday

Thompsonville

LA CROSSE, WIS.
TRIBUNE

e. 32,907

S. 32,772

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP. 1 1964

Campaign Should Force An Accounting

IF THE NEWS from South Viet Nam was grim 10 months ago when the Diem regime was toppled, and grimmer when their successor fell a few months later, it is appalling now.

These days, students yell in the streets and Buddhist monks—some of whom almost certainly are shaven-pated Vietcong in white robes — cry "foul!" and President Khanh drops his title.

But even with promises of more civilian control and more "democracy," the riots grow into looting mobs. Now there is talk of giving Khanh another try at the presidency, for 60 days, while the quarreling government forces sort out their distrusts and jealousies.

IT IS A POOR REWARD for the hundreds of American lives and untold dollars poured into the Vietnamese quagmire in three years. And there is neither victory nor end in sight.

Meantime, the civilian deaths and misery, the night raids by the Reds and the day bombings by government forces, go on. Yet there is no indication that the people prefer one rule to the other, or are ready to fight for their constituted government.

Months ago, despite the brave talk at Washington news conferences, an

ligence Agency was reporting privately that the anti-Communist war was being lost; that America's best hope was a military stalemate.

The CIA released that gloomy February forecast only a week ago when it learned that the Chicago Tribune was about to print it—and then only so it could deny that this really is the current thinking in Washington.

★ ★ ★

IT IS TIME, and then some, for Americans and the world to get the truth on the prospects in Viet Nam.

With the latest upheaval coming as the U.S. presidential campaign opens, it may be possible to get at the facts.

No one wants Viet Nam, a long-smouldering tragedy, to be used for partisan gain. But a chief obligation of the opposition party, election time or not, is to call for an accounting and make the administration explain and defend its case. That accounting is long overdue.

The most clearcut statement we've heard out of Washington on Viet Nam in months is its latest (and repeated) refusal to give Madame Nhu a visa to visit the United States. The reason: it might be upsetting to the Vietnamese.

Her remarks might be upsetting here, too. And we imagine that this prospect was more compelling than

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
EXPRESS

m. 68,894

S. 112,861

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date:

AUG 28 1964

South Viet Nam Has the Elements For a Bad Pre-Election Crisis

South Viet Nam may become the stickiest issue of the presidential campaign.

America is there as a part of the network of alliances forged by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. South Viet Nam represents the "last line" of defense in Southeast Asia, it having been moved back from Laos.

South Viet Nam is only a pimple on the face of Asia. This is the place where we are challenged to honor treaty obligations. This is the place where Red China may be trying to pressure her way into the United Nations, a long-sought goal. This could be the place where the seriousness of the split between Peking and Moscow can be judged.

President Johnson has demonstrated a readiness to make our presence a matter of top importance with the air strike in the Gulf of Tonkin. But inside South Viet Nam, political-religious strife prevents encouraging

progress on the job at hand: Defense of the land.

Senator Goldwater, in another confused statement, said he thought "that talks with the Red Chinese might be profitable." Later, after talking with his press aide, he relayed the thought that what he really meant was that we should get into stronger military position in the area then "blow up a bridge or something" and inform Peking what we will do "if they don't stop." He said that is what he meant by "negotiation."

A CIA working paper, suggesting neutralization of the area, agrees with President Charles de Gaulle of France. De Gaulle flatly says American policy in the area is wrong.

The De Gaulle view hangs up on a bafflement. The French view is that Laos needs to be left alone; that "foreign interference can only retard the hour of solution and peace." The French don't explain how to do this while North Viet Nam is using the country as a "neutral" corridor to supply guerrillas in South Viet Nam.

The only way to neutralize South Viet Nam is to neutralize all the old French Indo-China and that trick depends upon Red China's willingness to stop dabbling there.

The area could be a pre-election crisis but it is impossible to see how anybody could profit from it.

SANTA ROSA, CAL.
PRESS DEMOCRAT

e. 37,762

S. 39,176

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date:

AUG 30 1964

EDITORIAL

Vietnam Peace

WHETHER RELEASE last week of a CIA report suggesting a "negotiated peace" in Vietnam was a trial balloon to test public reaction remains to be seen.

One thing is undisputed. It is that should South Vietnam become Communist territory, the rest of Southeast Asia including The Philippines would fall in turn and Red China would control the same vast territory that the United States fought a successful war to prevent Japan from capturing.

There are sound reasons in recent history for suspecting that a "negotiated peace" in South Vietnam would turn out to be a surrender to the Communists by piecemeal methods.

W. Averill Harriman negotiated the "neutralization" of Laos. The net result has been that Laos became a sanctuary through which Communist weapons and men move to kill Americans who are defending South Vietnam in the role of "advisors."

IT HAS RECENTLY been made public that the terms under which Red Russia withdrew its nuclear weapons from Cuba were not laid down by the Administration as the public had been allowed to believe, but actually were Russian proposals submitted to our State Department through a television newscaster acting as intermediary. Regardless of where the terms originated, one of them was that there be on-site inspection in Cuba to make certain that the weapons had really been removed—and that no replacements had come in.

There has been no on-site inspection in Cuba and it is clear that there will be none. The terms have not been carried out.

If more recent proof was needed to that which has been accumulating over the years, the Laotian and the Cuban matters again establish that the pledges of Communist nations are worthless and impossible to trust.

Any Communist agreements concerning South Vietnam take over of that nation as soon as American military assistance had been withdrawn.

ADRIAN, MICHIGAN
TELEGRAM

e. 18,242

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
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Date: AUG 27 1964

New View On Viet Nam

Over the last weekend the Chicago Tribune reported some estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency which it had learned about. It said that an important group within the CIA put an optimistic appraisal on what it regarded as growing amiability on the part of the Soviet Union but took a decidedly pessimistic view of the prospects of defeating the Communists in South Viet Nam.

Almost immediately the administration in Washington released the text of a long document which hitherto had been top secret. A statement accompanying the release denied that the report represents either government or CIA policy. Even so, the release of the document adds an important element to an appraisal of Viet Nam. Likewise it supports the idea that "managed news" is still with us.

Plainly there was a leak of some sort to the Chicago paper. And just as plainly the complete document was released to the rest of the press in what the New York Herald Tribune said could be an effort "to defuse domestic political repercussions." The New York Times said the document "was released, after a leak, as a means of denying that

it represents administration policy."

Be that as it may. President Johnson and leading figures in his administration have been talking steadfastly about "winning the war in Viet Nam," while the CIA, reporting to the National Security Council headed by the President, reports there "is serious doubt that victory can be won" and that the best hope is that "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved.

In other words, the administration publicly says one thing while its highest intelligence estimates tell quite the opposite. There could be a campaign issue, and a hot one, in that.

Meanwhile the confusing situation in Viet Nam grows more confused. Gen. Khanh is unable to convince his fellow members of the ruling military junta that they should quit politics to prevent new riots by students and Buddhists. Khanh has resigned the presidency he assumed though retaining his military power. But nothing is done to implement assurances given the students that an election would be held to choose a president. And troops needed to ward off the Viet Cong guerrillas must be used to control civilian demonstrations that get more violent.

LANSING, MICH.
STATE JOURNAL

e. 70,182
S. 69,552

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 25 1964

Firm Viet Nam Decision By U.S. Is Long Overdue

A Central Intelligence Agency officer's "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam probably is shared by many other Americans in spite of the optimistic views expressed from time to time by various spokesmen for the Johnson administration.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against the Communist guerrillas in the southeast Asian country is in sight was voiced by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias said at that time that the Communist Viet Cong had stepped up their offensive while the counter-guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

In other words, the trend in the part of the world situation in South Viet Nam was unfavorable, in Matthias' view, as of last June. There are no indications it is any better now.

Stating that "the guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight", Matthias continued:

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization", an idea that has been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle but coolly received by the U.S. administration.

Matthias also said continued large scale U.S. support of the anti-guerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Viet Nam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate."

Neither alternative is palatable for the administration, some of whose spokesmen, following repeated but apparently futile visits to the strife-torn country, concede that the struggle will be long and hard but hold out hope for eventual victory.

The CIA officer's 50-page assessment of the situation was made available by administration sources when they learned it would be published in a Chicago newspaper.

This raises the question of whether it would ever have been made known to the American people upon the initiative of an administration which does not share, publicly at least, the pessimistic views expressed by Matthias.

One thing is clear. The unsatisfactory situation in South Viet Nam confronts the administration with the responsibility of deciding without more delay upon a policy designed to bring the war to a successful conclusion or to accept a policy of neutralization, unattractive as the latter alternative may be.

As we see it, the administration should make a determined effort to avoid a prolonged stalemate in which more millions of dollars in U.S. resources would be expended.

**SPRINGFIELD, OHIO
NEWS**

e. 28,633
S. 40,546

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 1 1964

CIA Report

That CIA report on long-range U.S. policy in South Vietnam hit the public glare at an awkward moment, what with student-Buddhist demonstrations flaring in Saigon, but it made solid sense nonetheless. At least one U.S. agency is keeping its head amid campaign cries for total victory.

It has been apparent to many Americans for more than a year—and to most Frenchmen for a decade—that total victory in Vietnam is high impossible without total war. Total victory, at least in the military sense, would require smashing the Viet Cong's North Vietnam breeding and feeding grounds. It would mean posing such a threat to China's security and to its prestige as the only true Marxist militant that Peking would be forced into direct involvement.

As the CIA study acknowledged, total military victory in South Vietnam fortunately isn't necessary for total victory of U.S. aims, which simply are to rid the nation of imported rebels and insure its independence. If South Vietnam, with U.S. aid, can stiffen resistance to the Viet Cong to the point where it no longer is feasible for Hanoi and Peking to continue funding guerrilla war, the nation could be neutralized with treaty guarantees against further outside adventuring within its boundaries.

Easier said than done, of course, especially now that the South Vietnamese ship of state is again rudderless and beset by factional squalls. Still, it is the long-run best bet. Perhaps the CIA study

will help keep American attention focused on it, even in this season when candidates tempt the public with one-shot, double-barreled solutions to complex problems.

HUNTINGTON, W.VA.
HERALD-DISPATCH

m. 44,336

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 4 1964

Editorials:

More Trouble In Southeast Asia

MAJ. GEN. NGUYEN Khanh is back in full command of South Viet Nam's shaky government (at least, he was yesterday afternoon), but there is nothing in the news from Saigon to indicate that either Khanh or the so-called caretaker government that functioned during Khanh's five-day "temporary retirement" has the support of the country.

The most recent crisis there points up the factionalism that has been undermining the war effort for many months. General Khanh himself recently said there were "five wars" waging inside of Viet Nam — wars that have pitted generals against generals, civilians against the military, Buddhists against Catholics, students and intellectuals against the government.

THE GOVERNMENTAL crisis really began with the struggle for power after the Diem regime was ousted last November and intensified after the January coup by General Khanh.

When the recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin diverted attention from the situation in Saigon, Khanh attempted to tighten his grip on the country by declaring an emergency, proclaiming a new constitution and promoting himself to the presidency.

But he was foolish enough to select a time that coincided with student and Buddhist demonstrations long planned for the anniversary of last year's pagoda raids and student protests. The Buddhist leaders, who in the last year have emerged as an important political force, used the opportunity to strike for a major role in the Vietnamese government.

Khanh said yesterday that he had won the support of these Buddhist leaders, who had threatened to renew their anti-government violence unless their demands were met. That remains to be seen.

MEANWHILE, the Johnson administration is reported to have

given consideration to a "egotiated settlement" in Viet Nam along lines set forth by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates.

This report by Matthias had been classified by the U. S. government, but was released to the press when the administration learned that it had been "leaked" to at least one newspaper.

The State Department promptly denied that the Matthias report represented anything more than a personal opinion of the writer and the fact that it paralleled the policy recommended by President de Gaulle of France was viewed as an inconsequential coincidence.

SO THE CRISIS in Viet Nam continues, only to be overshadowed by an even more critical situation in Malaysia. In that troubled country, a state of emergency has been declared following an airborne attack by Indonesian soldiers in an area only 100 miles from the Malaysian capital.

To counter this "flagrant act of aggression," as it was termed by the Malaysian government, Britain and her Commonwealth allies have been urged to give increased military and economic aid to Malaysia.

This they have promised to do and at last report — surprisingly enough — no help has been sought from the United States. Neither has any been offered.

OUR SYMPATHIES in this latest situation may logically rest with the Malaysians, but the irony is that the Indonesians are using millions of dollars of military hardware with which we have been supplying them since 1960 under the foreign aid program.

Is it any wonder that many Americans believe that the more we try to help some of these countries through the foreign aid program, the more enemies we make and the less good we accomplish?

MILES CITY, MONT.
STAR

e. 4,754

S. 4,754

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

SEP 6 1964

Date:

Contradictions in Viet Nam

Willard Matthias' working paper suggesting "some kind of negotiated settlement" of the Viet Nam war highlights the contradictions of our activity in South Viet Nam that must be kept in mind during the forthcoming election campaign. Mr. Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates wrote.

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

"There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

There it is again. This is the underlying policy that the planners keep trying to actuate. This is the point of view that caused the State Department to intervene and bring about the overflow of President Diem. Those holding this point of view were then thwarted when President Khanh overthrew the regime our State Department has brought to power.

This policy is being thwarted again today by a combination of

forces, but it persists in the policy-making agencies. President Khanh clearly opposed it. He wanted to defeat the Communists — a goal seemingly abhorrent to the State Department.

As a result, Thich Tri Quang and the other Buddhist monks who put on what the State Department called a good public relations job against Diem, undertook another campaign against Khanh.

But the real stumbling block for the planners is the election campaign. Even if he wanted to President Johnson could not at this moment have another "negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

Actually this contradiction between what the policy planners are trying to effect and such events as the Tonkin Gulf retaliation is a tremendous political advantage to the incumbent. The President can be dramatically anti-Communist when that attitude can reap the greatest political advantage.

At the same time, by repeating the assurances that he has already given, that he will not carry the war to the Communists, he can appear to be the champion of negotiation and patient diplomacy.

"A prolonged stalemate" such as Willard Matthias suggests or such as we sustained in Korea, or even the "negotiated settlement based on negotiation" that we are again hearing about, lead only to more Communist successes and what their appetites further.

IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO
POST REGISTER

e. 14,578

S. 20,248

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 3 1964

Tough Attitude Best Peace Stroke

A Central Intelligence Agency study seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead may come from U. S. actions which convince Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis.

The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, says:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by...

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself...

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not." Deterrence depends, says Matthias, in very considerable measure on how the enemy sizes up the determination and will of his opponent.

The Matthias study gives an example—how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Says this CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was

planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U. S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

The U. S. show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias says. He thinks that will stand the United States in good stead for a little while.

But he says there will be other times and other places in which Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U. S. actions. This could lead to trouble.

This study has the "general approval" of the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point."

HUNTINGTON, W.VA.
HERALD-DISPATCH

m. 44,336

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 28 1964

Editorials:

Peaceful Coexistence' Termed Red Strategy By American Bar

ALTHOUGH THE Johnson administration, through its controlled agencies and leading spokesmen, has been endeavoring to build the myth of a Communist change of character—a new attitude of friendliness and amiability—the facts do not bear out the theory.

Nikita Khrushchev continues to talk just as he has always talked. If there is any new amiability detectable in recent statements from the Kremlin, we fail to find it.

On Tuesday of this week, Russia accused the United States of trying to start a war in the Congo. It hinted at intervention in support of the rebels there.

Previously, Premier Khrushchev professed to view the civil war on Cyprus as some kind of "imperialist plot" hatched in Washington and London. He said Russia will "not remain indifferent" if Turkey continues to back up its Cypriot compatriots.

Turning to Southeast Asia, Khrushchev charged that the "imperialistic forces of the United States" have attacked North Viet Nam and are also "waging an undeclared war against the people of South Viet Nam."

THESE STATEMENTS hardly bear out the administration's endeavors to show that the Communists are no longer interested in stirring up trouble for us around the world, but want to be friendly and helpful.

Contradicting this view, a new study just released by the American Bar Association warns that "peaceful coexistence" has become "a carefully articulated strategy" for Communism's assault on free societies.

To take it as something less, the study states, would be to ignore the fundamental statement of the plan to accomplish the final phase of the attack against the non-Communist world.

Rather than diminishing the issues of the cold war, the study adds, the period of peaceful coexistence tends to obscure them and therefore compounds the dangers.

United States security, the study concludes, is in greater jeopardy today than in the most tense moments of naked Stalinism.

THIS, OF COURSE, is precisely the point of view that Senator Barry Goldwater has been trying to get across to the people of America. And Mr. Goldwater's refusal to be deceived by the "peaceful coexistence" propaganda accounts for the militant hostility of the Communist party in America toward the Republican Presidential nominee.

Gus Hall, the boss of the Communist party, is on record as being deeply concerned about the "ultra-right" movement in the United States. He has stated that it is a "central task" of his party "to mobilize the maximum number of Americans to express themselves politically against the ultra-right," because "the struggle against the ultra-right is decisive for the very future of the electoral system itself."

Of course, "ultra-right" in the Communist sense designates anti-Communists and conservatives who loathe Communism.

BUT THIS does not prevent the Central Intelligence Agency from declaring — in a 47-page report on the state of the world released last week only when the Johnson administration discovered that it had been "leaked" to The Chicago Tribune—that:

"Over the long run, we continue to believe that the gradual changes taking place in the USSR will diminish its hostility to the west and the vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the Communist world . . . This process of change . . . is probably irreversible."

Readers with long memories will recall that Walt W. Rostow, the State Department policy planner, enunciated about the same outlook more than two years ago.

More recently, Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, invited his countrymen to "dispel the cobwebs of myth" which affect their minds and start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts."

Continued

Among these would be the thought that the devil does not reside im-
mutably in Moscow. Another (men-
tioned in his latest book, "Old
Myths And New Realities") is
that the United States go "more
than halfway" in meeting Commu-
nist-inspired complaints about the
Panama Canal, and that Russia
and other countries be invited to
join us in building a new sea-level
canal in Central America.

BUT IN SPITE of all these as-
surances that Russia is now a safe
and friendly playmate, and that
Communism no longer seeks to in-
cite world revolution and the over-
throw of democratic governments,
Khrushchev and his pals continue
to talk as they have always talked.

The casual hunches of the
CIA and the optimistic forecasts
of administration spokesmen not-
withstanding, we think the safe
course for the nation is stated in
the Republican Platform—which
declares that "Communism is the
enemy of this nation in every
sense until it can prove that its
enmity can be abandoned."

AUG 28 1964

**TUSCALOOSA, ALA.
NEWS**

e. 20,361
S. 19,564

Front Page Editor Page Other Page

Date: SEP 3 1964

EDITORIALS

The Backbone Of Deterrence

The danger of divisive tactics that seem to tear us asunder is sounded in a Central Intelligence Agency's study that determination is a key factor in deterring enemy attacks.

In the study made for the CIA Board of National Estimates it is stated:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by. . .

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself. .

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not."

The full effectiveness of our deterrent strength depends on large measure on our determination and unity of purpose.

Thus the order from President Johnson to move decisively in the Gulf of Tonkin incident once again proved to our adversaries that we would move quickly and effectively when attacked. Beyond the military significance of this move was the overwhelming fact that it had the strong and almost unanimous support of a vast majority of the people of this country.

The big mistake the dictators have made in the past is their failure to comprehend the determination and will of the people of this country. We do not need to rattle swords to prove to our foes that we are determined to defend and preserve our freedom.

And we will be doing ourselves a great disservice if we allow the heat of the political campaign to give to the world a feeling that we are so badly divided in national will and purpose that we are uncertain and fearful of the future.

STAMFORD, CONN.
ADVOCATE

e. 29,269

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: AUG 27 1964

Defeatism

An interesting report, said to be a CIA document, was published in a Chicago newspaper. This report says there is doubt we can win in Viet Nam, that the best we can do there is a stalemate, and that we should negotiate a settlement with the Communists on the basis of establishing a "neutral" South Viet Nam.

It would be unrealistic to pretend that any newspaper could get a secret CIA report without someone in high office agreeing to the "leak." The damaging report was unquestionably a preparation for a defense of a defeatist policy in South Viet Nam. Arguments are already being made that there is no alternative to a "political settlement" in South Viet Nam which will establish a truly neutral government there. It is suggested that this settlement cannot be made until after the elections, because the American people would reject the administration if it took such a course.

The idea that Peking would allow North Viet Nam to become part of a truly neutral state is absurd. Peking is swallowing up its neighbors, not granting them freedom. Thus, the negotiated political settlement would in reality be a surrender. It could not even be confused as a "calculated risk," like Laos.

This is not to say that the war can be won in Viet Nam under present conditions. As long as the enemy sanctuary is safe, it will be impossible to end what is correctly called a stalemate. The question is whether it is in the American interest to risk the war,

or whether we should quit and surrender. This decision is difficult because we are in Viet Nam because it is a bastion against Communism takeover of all Southeast Asia. If South Viet Nam falls, India is flanked and the way to Australia open. The free world will have lost an important area of the world.

The importance of the decision means that it must be decided on the basis of full information, not on leaks designed to protect the party

in power. The administration use of the CIA for political purposes is in itself a sad reflection on its conduct of foreign affairs.

MANCHESTER, N. H.
UNION LEADER
(Sunday NEWS)

d. 51,228

S. 44,203

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

SEP 3 1964

Date:

IMPORTANT

Can't Win? Tommyrot!

By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER

HERE WE GO AGAIN. The "no win policy" continues in Viet Nam in spite of all the brave words and the Navy counterattack in the Gulf of Tonkin. What is worse, friends of the administration are insisting that the United States "cannot win" against communist guerrillas.

It is now clear that just as President Kennedy was satisfied to eliminate the (long range) Soviet missiles from Cuba, leaving Castro there, so President Johnson went out of his way to assure the Communists that in resisting North Vietnamese aggression, the United States was not even thinking of liberating North Viet Nam.

Not only we announced what the Navy was about to do an hour and a half before we struck, but LBJ apparently reassured Mr. K. in Moscow concerning the purely defensive character of our reaction. And now, of all things, he has withdrawn our warships from the Gulf of Tonkin, lest we "provoke" Red China, or Red Russia or Red Korea or Red Somebody. All that the United States wants is a neutral, "free" South Viet Nam. This means a return to the status quo before Red China and North Viet Nam sparked the revolt there. More "pure defense" of the kind that never won anything.

Nor is this all. We expected Sen. Wayne Morse, that "pacifist-isolationist," to furnish arguments to the enemy radios.

"We Can't Win"

But it is a little surprising to be told by the Central Intelligence Agency that the United States cannot win in South Viet Nam and therefore must negotiate. For the argument flies in the face of recent history.

The argument is one we have heard before: That the weak peoples have invented a method of warfare which enables them to elude and circumvent the great warfare of the great powers. That the only way to defeat the guerrilla is to put much larger numbers of men on the ground. That the experience of the British and the French, the Belgians and the Dutch, is that guerrilla warfare in Africa and Asia can have no victorious military solution.

Interesting if true. But let's look at the record.

1—Had it not been for the regular armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Americans in the Pacific, the Japanese armies would easily have defeated the Chinese Communist guerrillas.

2—The Philippines government, aided by the United States, thoroughly defeated the communist Huk guerrillas.

3—The British in Malaya by a mixed effort largely consisting in the use of British troops, eliminated Communist guerrillas from that country and set up a pro-Western government in an independent country.

PALESTINE, TEX.
HERALD-PRESS

e. 7,577

S. 7,941

Front Page Edit Page Other Page

Date: SEP 4 1964

TOUGH ATTITUDE INSURES PEACE

In contrast to the soft line taken on Communism by the U.S. State Department, some other authorities within the government long have warned, and continue to warn, that appearance of softness by this country encourages Communism to risk adventures that might lead to war.

It should be encouraging to most Americans that there are still officials in the government who see the strength of the United States, in materiel and in attitude, as the only way to protect our nation and keep the peace of the world. Thus this country's safety will depend on which set of experts the president, whoever he may be, chooses to listen to.

Even as the tippy-toed policies of the State Department continue to be pressed upon the White House, others, including the military and intelligence agencies, submit to the president much more hard-boiled and clear-minded recommendations. An example the other day was a Central Intelligence Agency report on the risk of nuclear war. As reported by Ray Cromley, Newspaper Enterprise Association columnist, here is the gist of the report:

WASHINGTON (NEA) — A Central Intelligence Agency study seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead may come from U.S. actions which convince Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis.

The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, says:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by . . .

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously

protecting oneself.

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

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The Matthias study gives an example—how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Says this CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U.S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

The U.S. show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias says. He thinks that will stand the United States in good stead for a little while.

But he says there will be other times and places in which Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U.S. actions. This could lead to trouble.

This study has the "general approval" of the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point."

MONROE, LA.
NEWS-STAR

e. 16,896

Front Edit Other
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Date: SEP 1 1964

Short-Lived Firmness

Although it happened during the pre-Democratic convention days, the firm position the United States took on North Viet Nam was not really an action of another age. That was recent history in our book and the problems in connection with our position in south-east Asia cannot be brushed aside.

Now it appears all the firmness was but a brief flurry. Virtually all the rumors concerning our "carrying the war to the enemy" have died.

Since early August, Major General Nguyen Khanh has been in trouble with various South Vietnamese factions. Though generously supplied with military supplies and advice, he has failed to halt the advances of Red guerrilla attacks within his country.

Factional fights within the southeastern countries have made it difficult for governments offering even a small measure of freedom to hold together. With so strong a man as Diem at the helm, South Viet Nam displayed this tendency.

It's no wonder, then, that the more youthful General Khanh — for all his military understanding and leadership — cannot hold the pieces together effectively. He tried to surround himself with a strong palace guard, but his hold

grown steadily weaker.

He took office with an ambitious plan to win the confidence of his people and step up the war effort. But as the balance sheet in gains and losses grows longer, we see the communist Viet Cong forces have a definite edge.

The South Vietnamese villagers side with the communists in fear and so-called "religious riots" in the cities result in serious breakdowns in law and order.

Not too many months ago, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara visited southeast Asia. On returning, he predicted our job would be complete in that area as soon as 1965. On a subsequent trip he lost some of that optimism.

Now a Central Intelligence evaluation of South Viet Nam which was made public several weeks ago says the Khanh regime lacked leadership and that "there remains serious doubt that victory can be won."

What was the reasoning behind the highly effective U. S. attack on North Vietnamese PT-boat bases? What had at first seemed to be a change of policy — an actual move toward victory — has apparently turned out to be an impressively won battle in a generally losing proposition.

**SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DESERET NEWS-
SALT LAKE TELEGRAM**

e. 87,200

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date: SEP 1 1964

The Mess In Viet Nam

UNFORTUNATELY, the image of South Viet Nam that emerges after a week of bloody turmoil can only be described as a mess. At the price of 11 killed and 83 wounded from the rioting, the country has been left with:

1. A civilian as acting premier who at best faces the impossible task of producing political stability in only two months and at worst faces the prospect of being replaced momentarily since he serves at the pleasure of the military clique rather than the people.

2. A military establishment whose rank and file is suffering a letdown in morale as a result of the crisis in Saigon, whose senior officers are more preoccupied with politics than with war, and whose generals are jockeying among themselves for power.

3. A civilian population perched precariously on the brink of religious warfare and which is gripped by what reporters describe as a "nationwide malaise."

Since it is folly to bargain from weakness rather than strength, now is

obviously not the time to seek to negotiate a settlement in Viet Nam with the Communists as has been suggested by many sources from French President DeGaulle to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Indeed, it's questionable if a negotiated settlement will ever be desirable since neighboring Laos shows how the Communists use the "neutralization" of a country to consolidate their gains, only to gobble up more territory later.

But if the people of South Viet Nam have lost their will to resist aggression, there's little the U.S. can do for them. If the will to endure hardship is to be restored, the people of South Viet Nam need to be given a voice in determining their fate.

THIS MEANS MORE ^{this} than just having a civilian as the nominal head of government. It means more than just a new constitution. It means, specifically, that South Viet Nam needs to hold a popular election. The sooner this is done the sooner it can be determined if South Viet Nam has what it takes to prevail against its foes.

WAUKEGAN, ILL.		
NEWS-SUN		
e. 33,593		
Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
Date: SEP 3 1964		

An Insurance Policy For Peace

WHAT POSES the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead?

The answer offered in a study by the Central Intelligence Agency is, we think, correct — namely, a miscalculation by Soviet leaders of the U.S. will to resist in a crisis.

The point closely parallels one made by David Lawrence today in his editorial page column analyzing the causes of World War II. Appeasement and vacillation by the United States and Hitler's European neighbors emboldened the Nazi leader to take the reckless steps that produced a world bloodbath.

The CIA study, prepared by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, notes that deterrence is the key. It is our best insurance against war. This means that, in addition to prodigious nuclear might, a nation must manifest unmistakably a determination to use its power if pushed too far.

The Matthias study gives a good example in reverse — how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Says the CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to

save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U.S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

THE SOVIETS, of course, badly misjudged our determination in 1962. We meant business and we proved it.

However, this has not stopped further probing by the Soviets or other Communist adversaries, as the complex situation in Southeast Asia illustrates. Our show of toughness in Cuba in 1962 stands us in good stead — but only temporarily. There are now other places and other circumstances where our enemies could misread our will power.

And that, as the saying goes, could be the ball game.